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Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan 
DAVID A. LOGAN 
“I think it is time for a modern War against Error. A 
deliberately heightened battle against cultivated ignorance, 
enforced silence, and metastasizing lies.” 
– Toni Morrison, The War on Error (2019) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our democracy is in trouble, awash in an unprecedented number of lies—
some spewed by foreign enemies targeting our electoral processes,1 others 
promoted by our leaders,2 and millions upon millions spread by shadowy 
sources on the internet and, especially, via social media.3 Chief Justice John 
Roberts recently warned that “[i]n our age . . . social media can instantly spread 
rumor and false information on a grand scale,” causing harm to our democracy.4 
The internet has become our “public square,”5 something beyond the 
 
 1 See Ellen Nakashima, Senate Committee Unanimously Endorses Spy Agencies’ 
Finding that Russia Interfered in 2016 Presidential Race in Bid to Help Trump, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/senate-committee-
unanimously-endorses-spy-agencies-finding-that-russia-interfered-in-2016-presidential-
race-in-bid-to-help-trump/2020/04/21/975ca51a-83d2-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/AYX4-ECHG]. The threat continues for the 2020 elections. The U.S. 
intelligence community’s top election security official recently acknowledged that “Russia 
is using a range of measures to primarily denigrate former Vice President Biden,” and that 
“some Kremlin-linked actors are also seeking to boost President Trump’s candidacy on 
social media and Russian television.” Max Boot, A Damning New Article Reveals How 
Trump Enables Russian Election Interference, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/08/russia-is-interfering-our-elections-
again-trump-wont-let-intelligence-community-say-so/ [https://perma.cc/794R-7MLW]. 
 2 In his first 1,226 days in office President Trump made 19,127 false or misleading 
claims, an average of over 15 per day. Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo & Meg Kelly, 
President Trump Made 19,127 False or Misleading Claims in 1,226 Days, WASH. POST 
(June 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/01/president-trump-
made-19127-false-or-misleading-claims-1226-days/ [https://perma.cc/8EG5-VU52]. He 
managed to include four in a single sentence. Daniel Dale, Fact Check: Trump Makes Four 
False Claims in One Sentence, CNN (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/14/ 
politics/fact-check-trump-mccabe-clinton-mcauliffe/index.html [https://perma.cc/6CDC-
6KJR]. Tracking the President’s falsehoods has become a bit of a parlor game. See, e.g., Tom 
Toles, Time to Stop Counting Trump’s Lies. We’ve Hit the Total for ‘Compulsive Liar.’, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/ 
09/13/time-to-stop-counting-trumps-lies-weve-hit-the-total-for-compulsive-liar/ [https://per 
ma.cc/BK5C-QXWG]. 
 3 See Graham Daseler, The Internet’s Web of Lies, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-internets-web-of-lies/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4SMC-QK6U] (“Facebook has 200 million monthly users in the United States . . . . In a 
single minute, the site receives 500,000 new comments, 293,000 new statuses, and 450,000 
new photos. In the same amount of time, 400 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube, and 
300,000 tweets are posted to Twitter.”); see also Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, 
The Spread of True and False News Online, SCI. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://science.science 
mag.org/content/359/6380/1146 [https://perma.cc/6LAV-XQZE] (analysis of Twitter 
postings from 2006–17 showed that false news reached many more people than the truth and 
also diffused faster than the truth). 
 4 See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2019 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1, 2 
(Dec. 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-endreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D55R-AZXJ]. 
 5 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
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imagination of the Supreme Court when it issued its groundbreaking 1964 
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.6 
New York Times involved defamation, a narrow pocket of state tort law,7 
but the decision has come to be regarded as a signature accomplishment of the 
Warren Court8 and essential to the modern understanding of the First 
Amendment.9 The case is routinely described as “seminal”10 and “iconic”11 and 
is cited with favor by Justices across the ideological spectrum.12 Most 
importantly, New York Times defanged defamation law, recognizing that our 
democracy needs to protect even speech that is false.13  
But with more than half a century of perspective, it is now clear that the 
Court’s constraints on defamation law have facilitated a miasma of 
misinformation that harms democracy by making it more difficult for citizens 
to become informed voters.14 The time has come to ask a once heretical 
question: “What if New York Times got it wrong?” 
This Article assesses New York Times in light of a public square radically 
different than that familiar to the justices a half century ago. The internet and 
especially social media have deeply eroded the influence of traditional media.15 
 
 6 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 7 Dean William Prosser regarded New York Times as “unquestionably the greatest 
victory won by . . . defendants in the modern history of the law of torts.” WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 819 (4th ed. 1971); see R. Perry Sentelle, Jr., 
Torts in Verse: The Foundational Cases, 39 GA. L. REV. 1197, 1202, 1397 (2005) (stating 
that New York Times is one of “the truly foundational cases ordinarily studied in first year 
Torts”). 
 8 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Intersection and Divergence: Some Reflections on the 
Warren Court, Civil Rights, and the First Amendment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1075, 1075 
(2002) (opining that New York Times is “the Warren Court’s most notable First Amendment 
case”); Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2018) (opining that New York Times was “one of the most important free speech decisions 
of all time”). 
 9 See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS 
FOR A NEW CENTURY 14 (2010) (calling New York Times “[o]ne of the most important First 
Amendment decisions in the twentieth century, and perhaps of all time”); Floyd Abrams, In 
Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 18, 21 (1997) (noting that New York 
Times “is the quintessential First Amendment ruling in our history”). 
 10 Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 517, 
567 (2019); Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment and 
Securities Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903, 910 (2014). 
 11 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 153 (2012); KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK 
TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 201 (2011). 
 12 Scott L. Nelson, Commentary, Dun & Bradstreet Revisited—A Comment on Levine 
and Wermiel, 88 WASH. L. REV. 103, 122 (2013). 
 13 The link between free speech protections and democracy is discussed in detail in this 
Article. See infra notes 60–101 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 274–316. 
 15 See Solomon A. Ware Sr., The Impact of Social Media on Traditional Journalism, 
DAILY OBSERVER (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.liberianobserver.com/opinion/the-impact-
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The Court’s hands-off approach to false speech, at the heart of New York Times, 
has been weaponized,16 facilitating a public square rife with “fake news” and 
“alternative facts,”17 which has led to a dramatic decrease in trust in our 
government and leaders.18 I conclude that to save our democracy, New York 
Times should be retooled for our times. 
Part II sets the stage by explaining the crucial role played by the media in 
the Civil Rights Movement and how segregationists tried to protect “their way 
of life” from challenges by “outside agitators” like reporters from national 
media outlets.19 A central aspect of a multifaceted resistance strategy was 
intimidating the media through the filing of libel suits, one of which was 
presided over by a segregationist judge and decided by an all-white Alabama 
jury, which assessed a huge damages award that appeared to threaten the very 
existence of one of America’s “papers of record,” the New York Times, and thus 
coverage of the crucial political, legal, and social struggle unfolding in the 
South.20 Part II concludes with a discussion of how the appellate lawyers for the 
Times helped shape the thinking of the Court about the link between free speech 
and democracy and how the justices’ internal deliberations led to the landmark 
decision. 
Part III explains in detail the many ways that New York Times and its 
progeny changed the law, and it surveys doctrinal alternatives that would have 
better balanced the need to promote accuracy in public debate.  
Part IV then turns to three important and related developments that have 
magnified the adverse impact of New York Times: changes in journalistic 
 
of-social-media-on-traditional-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/59E2-M32J] (“Nowadays, 
most public events are screened live on Facebook, a move that is viewed by many as eroding 
interest in the traditional media.”). 
 16 See P.W. SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKEWAR: THE WEAPONIZATION OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (2018) (explaining how “a new kind of communication[] became a new 
kind of war”). 
 17 See Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications, 
Bullshit, and Straight-out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 367, 371 
(2018) (stating that citizens can make informed judgments about political issues only “if the 
internet is not full of fake news or alternative facts”). 
 18 Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker, & Sophia Fedeli, 
Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical Problem That Needs to Be Fixed, PEW 
RES. CTR. (June 5, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-
made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ [https://perma.cc/N8ZK-
BN37] (showing “made-up news and information” has impacted 68% of American’s 
“confidence in government institutions”). See generally Trust in Government, GALLUP, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx [https://perma.cc/NF69-7TZB] 
(showing the decrease in Americans’ trust in the government from 1972 to 2020). 
 19 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) 
(“Montgomery is one of the localities in which widespread hostility to desegregation has 
been manifested. This hostility has sometimes extended itself to persons who favor 
desegregation, particularly to so-called ‘outside agitators,’ a term which can be made to fit 
papers like the Times, which is published in New York.”). 
 20 See HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 84; infra Part II. 
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practices, the arrival of the internet (in particular, the twenty-four-hour news 
cycle), and the rapid rise of social media. These forces have fundamentally 
altered the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, 
a central concern of the democracy-enhancing theory at the core of New York 
Times, throwing into question the continued wisdom of the Court’s decision. 
Part V examines how New York Times and its progeny have operated in 
practice by analyzing the most recent empirical data on defamation litigation. 
Only one conclusion can be drawn from the data: there is now what amounts to 
an absolute immunity from damages actions for false statements, and this 
evisceration of the deterrent power of defamation law has facilitated a torrent of 
false information entering our public square. 
Finally, in Part VI, I argue that the Court’s almost unrestrained embrace of 
free speech in New York Times and subsequent decisions has, contrary to the 
goal of improving public debate, actually impoverished it. I conclude with a 
brief discussion of changes that, if adopted, would enhance rather than erode 
our democracy. 
II. THE MAKING OF A SEMINAL DECISION 
A. Defending White Supremacy by Attacking the Messenger  
Like many Deep South communities in the 1950s, Montgomery, Alabama, 
was struggling to adjust to the economic changes sweeping the region and a 
restive Black population demanding rights systematically denied them in the 
century since the emancipation.21 Segregationists insisted that these demands 
for equality were not coming from locals, but rather were the result of “outside 
agitators”—a cadre of activists who came to the South with a passion for social 
justice—and the national media, which was giving increasing, and negative, 
coverage of race relations in the South.22 
Print outlets and the relatively new technology of television beefed up their 
staffs in hotspots like Montgomery, and the national media regularly covered 
angry white mobs and their allies from the local police humiliating, beating, and 
hosing nonviolent demonstrators.23 Especially powerful was television 
coverage that brought the vivid sights and sounds of racial brutality into 
America’s living rooms, but the print media also captivated readers with hard-
 
 21 See HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 5. 
 22 David Wallace, Piercing the Paper Curtain: The Southern Editorial Response to 
National Civil Rights Coverage, 33 AM. JOURNALISM 401, 406–09 (2016). One contemporary 
observer sarcastically commented: “[A]s if it took someone from somewhere else to reveal 
to unsuspecting Alabama African[-]Americans that whites had better schools, better jobs, 
more opportunities, more respect, and more advantages.” HARVEY H. JACKSON III, INSIDE 
ALABAMA: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF MY STATE 245 (2004). 
 23 Wallace, supra note 22, at 401–02. 
764 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:5 
hitting coverage of tense confrontations between citizens and entrusted power.24 
Just as in another context it was observed that sunlight is “the best of 
disinfectants,”25 canny civil rights leaders then, as now, fed tips about local 
injustices to reporters.26 This, in turn, fanned southern xenophobia and 
convinced whites that the “southern way of life” was under assault.27  
Segregationists responded with an array of legal tools. Of course, they 
defended explicitly race-based laws, like the requirement that students be 
separated by race in public schools.28 They also employed indirect ways to push 
back that were not obviously racist: forcing civil rights groups to identify their 
members (which could be embarrassing or even dangerous to African-
Americans), pursuing tax charges against individuals and groups, filing ethics 
charges against lawyers who appeared on behalf of civil rights clients and 
disciplinary charges against students who had the temerity to demonstrate, and 
using race-neutral trespass laws to frustrate peaceful efforts to integrate public 
accommodations.29 
Southern anger at the media prompted another indirect strategy: filing libel 
lawsuits against national media organizations. Plaintiffs sought millions of 
dollars in damages from CBS News, the Saturday Evening Post, and Ladies 
Home Journal, but the primary target was the “national paper of record,” the 
New York Times.30 The Times had provoked great anger with a harsh report on 
the state of race relations in the South,31 and it made itself a perfect target when 
 
 24 See generally GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION (2006). 
 25 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”). 
 26 For example, the Black Visions Collective in Minnesota has its own “press team.” 
Lizzie LeBow, Minneapolis Reporters Covering the George Floyd Protests Face Attacks, 
Calls for Neutral Language, GATEWAY JOURNALISM REV. (June 23, 2020), http://gateway 
jr.org/minneapolis-reporters-covering-the-george-floyd-protests-face-attacks-calls-for-
neutral-language/ [https://perma.cc/64EG-8S6Q]; see also Media Tips for Activist Groups, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/electronic-frontier-alliance/media-tips 
[https://perma.cc/4VGD-HB7Z]. 
 27 See Paul Finkelman, Essay, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 
115–16 (1985). 
 28 See Christopher W. Schmidt, New York Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on 
the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2014). 
 29 Id. at 298–304. 
 30 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
305–06 (1991) [hereinafter LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW]; Schmidt, supra note 28, at 305, 328. 
 31 Harrison E. Salisbury, Fear and Hatred Grip Birmingham, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1960, at 1 (“Every channel of communication, every medium of mutual interest, every 
reasoned approach, every inch of middle ground has been fragmented by the emotional 
dynamite of racism, reinforced by the whip, the razor, the gun, the bomb, the torch, the club, 
the knife, the mob, the police and many branches of the state’s apparatus.”). In addition to 
damages actions brought by local officials, a Times reporter was indicted on counts of 
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it printed an error-filled advertisement seeking financial support for the 
representation of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who had been charged with 
violating Alabama law.32 The advertisement detailed misconduct by “Southern 
violators of the Constitution” and alleged improper police behavior but named 
no specific perpetrators.33 The Times did no fact-checking before publishing, 
relying on the illustrious names who endorsed the advertisement34 and the 
signatures of four Alabama preachers, who were particular irritants to the 
Alabama power structure.35  
The misstatements in the advertisement were relatively minor36 but 
Alabama libel law (like that in most states) made any printed misstatement that 
harmed reputation not just actionable but potentially the basis for a large 
damages award.37 Southern officials pounced, seeking more than $3 million in 
actions filed in Montgomery and an additional $3.15 million in actions filed in 
Birmingham, while Alabama Governor John Patterson sought another $1 
million.38 At a time when an award of $35,000 was considered large, the 
management of the Times was understandably alarmed by its liability 
exposure.39 This was especially so given the paper’s modest circulation in 
Alabama (390 on an average day, just .06% of its total circulation), which made 
 
criminal libel. William E. Lee, Citizen-Critics, Citizen Journalists, and the Perils of Defining 
the Press, 48 GA. L. REV. 757, 759 n.10 (2014). 
 32 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 15–24. While on its face an advertisement, the 
content could fairly be characterized as a “piece of propaganda designed to attract sympathy 
and money.” Id. at 21. 
 33 See id. at 19. The common law allowed a defamation action to be brought by a person 
not named if the jury could infer that the statements were “of and concerning” the plaintiff. 
1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2-
168–71 (5th ed. 2017). 
 34 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 15–20. 
 35 Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 43 N.C. L. REV. 315, 319–22 (1965) (referring to Reverends Ralph D. Abernathy, 
Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S.S. Seay Sr., and J. E. Lowery). 
 36 The most serious errors suggested that police had bombed Dr. King’s home and that 
they tried to “starve the [student demonstrators] into submission.” LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, 
supra note 30, at 30–31. 
 37 See Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: 
Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826 n.4 (1984) (explaining that in 
N.Y. Times, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Alabama followed the then-majority 
approach to defamation). Alabama law tracked the majority rules across the United States: 
falsity was presumed; damages were presumed; and absent some common law privilege, the 
plaintiff did not need to prove any fault. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 
§ 1:8 (2d ed. 2008). 
 38 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 31–33; LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, 
at 13. 
 39 See MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS 
AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960–1979, at ix (1982) (stating that the average 
jury award in 1960 was $30,000). 
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it hard to treat coverage of the Civil Rights Movement as simply a cost of doing 
business.40 
One of the plaintiffs in the first case filed was the Montgomery 
commissioner in charge of the police, L.B. Sullivan.41 The presiding judge was 
notoriously bigoted, and the case was heard by an all-white jury.42 The local 
media stirred the racial pot.43 The newspaper’s situation was bleak, as there was 
no authority to support a First Amendment defense,44 and the lawyers for the 
Times tried but failed to get the case dismissed on procedural grounds.45 The ad 
admittedly contained misstatements and the Times had no proof that it had taken 
steps to verify the statements: it could only hope that the jury would conclude 
that, because Sullivan was not actually named, the statements were not “of and 
concerning” him.46 In closing argument, a lawyer for Sullivan urged the jury to 
“hit them in the pocketbook” and send a message to northern media.47 The trial 
judge allowed the jury to consider both compensatory and punitive damages, 
and it took the jury only two hours to award Sullivan $500,000, by far the largest 
damages award in Alabama history.48 
 
 40 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 21. Up to the New York Times case, libel actions 
had not been a major concern for the Times, which had a policy of never settling, and it rarely 
lost the few claims that had made it to trial. LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 23. 
 41 Schmidt, supra note 28, at 294.  
 42 Id. at 318. Judge Walter B. Jones had already issued a series of orders by which he 
hoped to thwart enforcement of civil rights laws—not surprising given that he was the author 
of The Confederate Creed and had participated in Confederate reenactments. LEWIS, MAKE 
NO LAW, supra note 30, at 25–26. Judge Jones kept the races separated in his courtroom, and 
in a libel case tried after Sullivan’s he commented, “The case would be tried . . . ‘under the 
laws of the State of Alabama and not under the Fourteenth Amendment,’” and he “praised 
‘white man’s justice, a justice born long centuries ago in England, brought over to this 
country by the Anglo-Saxon race.” Id. There was even an allegation that Judge Jones helped 
plan the wave of libel claims filed against the media. Id. at 26. 
 43 LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 10–11. For example, in the run-up to the 
trial a leading Montgomery newspaper described the advertisement in the Times as a “big 
lie” from “abolitionist hellmouths.” Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan and Cultural History: 
New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339, 350 (1991); Grover 
Hall, Will They Purge Themselves?, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 7, 1960, at 4-A. 
 44 See infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 45 See HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 47–51. 
 46 See LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 27–28, 32–33. 
 47 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 63. 
 48 CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 28 (1981); Bruce L. Ottley, 
John Bruce Lewis, & Younghee Jin Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan: A Retrospective 
Examination, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 763 (1983). The judgment was against the Times and 
the four ministers. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 88. In a remarkably cruel move, 
Judge Jones gave the ministers the choice of paying the full amount or posting a $1 million 
bond. Id. When they resisted, a local sheriff seized their bank accounts, seized Reverend 
Abernathy’s car, and sold a plot of land that he owned. Id. 
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This award, the equivalent of more than $4 million today,49 was understood 
by all concerned to be a shot across the bow of the national media. For example, 
one Alabama newspaper argued that the jury’s decision could make the national 
media “re-survey . . . their habit of permitting anything detrimental to the South 
and its people to appear in their columns.”50 Another ran the headline “State 
Finds Formidable Legal Club to Swing at Out-of-State Press.”51 An experienced 
observer, noting that Sullivan’s award likely presaged a string of similar huge 
awards, questioned whether the Times could survive52 and predicted that the 
verdict might prompt the Times to decide that it was simply too risky for its 
reporters to even set foot in Alabama and instead rely on wire service reports.53 
This existential threat fueled the Times’s appeal.54  
B. Forging a New Understanding of the First Amendment 
From the beginning of the litigation, the leadership of the Times vowed to 
spare no cost to defend the case,55 and the legal team assembled for the appeal 
to the Alabama Supreme Court included former Attorney General of the United 
States Herbert Brownell Jr. and Professor Herbert Wechsler from Columbia 
Law School.56 The initial focus was again on jurisdiction because a First 
Amendment defense ran counter to statements of the Supreme Court, albeit in 
dicta, that libels were not protected speech.57 The Alabama Supreme Court 
affirmed Sullivan’s award, rejecting the jurisdictional challenge and dismissing 
the First Amendment argument with a single sentence, forthrightly 
acknowledging that its decision was intended to have both a specific and general 
deterrent effect on the media.58 
 
 49 Value of $500,000 in 1960, SAVING.ORG, https://www.saving.org/inflation/inflation. 
php?amount=500,000&year=1960 [https://perma.cc/U28S-PTNW]. 
 50 LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 34. 
 51 Id. at 35. 
 52 Id. Within the next four years, $300 million worth of libel claims were filed against 
the media for coverage of the Civil Rights Movement. See id. at 36. 
 53 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 84. 
 54 Recent scholarship has unearthed almost forty such claims that were 
“weaponizing . . . libel [actions] against activists and the media . . . .” AIMEE EDMONSON, IN 
SULLIVAN’S SHADOW: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW DURING THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS 
STRUGGLE 7–8 (2019). 
 55 LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 24. 
 56 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 100. 
 57 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (holding that libel is not 
“within the area of constitutionally protected speech”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous . . . .”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 58 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 40, 49 (Ala. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). Needless to say, all the justices on the Alabama Supreme Court were white. HALL & 
UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 114. 
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The Times decided to seek certiorari and Wechsler, a seasoned advocate in 
the High Court, took full control of the litigation and focused on the First 
Amendment challenge.59 It was not an easy road. In addition to the unpromising 
judicial statements that a libel was not protected speech, there was little 
constitutional basis for a reversal because the case did not involve a prior 
restraint.60 Nevertheless, Wechsler was confident that properly framed, 
Sullivan’s judgment would directly raise a question that the Court had not yet 
considered: whether a damages award arising out of a statement critical of 
official conduct was consistent with the First Amendment.61 More specifically, 
he wanted to focus on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798, the 
brazen effort by Federalists to punish their Republican opponents.62 There is 
disagreement about the extent to which the statute actually chilled criticism of 
public officials,63 but it was roundly condemned at the time by many, including 
Framers Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and when Jefferson became 
President the law expired, and he pardoned all those convicted under it.64 
A frontal constitutional attack was a bold gambit, and even though Wechsler 
was by no means a reflexive civil libertarian,65 he understood that if Sullivan’s 
 
 59 LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 103–06. 
 60 See id. at 102–05, 114. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) 
(discussing prior restraint and establishing it as a constitutional basis for reversal). 
 61 See HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 106–09. 
 62 The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97 (expired 1801), made it a 
crime to “write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or 
writings against the government of the United States . . . with intent to defame . . . .” The Act 
largely codified English sedition law, which was a potent addition to press licensing as a tool 
to repress speech critical of the government. See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 
and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 154, 154 (2001). 
 63 Compare NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 265 (1986) (opining that the Sedition Act turned out to be a 
“relatively flimsy legal tool” against the Federalists’ Jeffersonian opposition), with David A. 
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 515 (1983) [hereinafter 
Anderson, Origins] (opining that “the Sedition Act was no idle threat”). 
 64 David A. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 493, 500 (1990) [hereinafter Logan, Tort Law]; Sedition Act Expires, FIRE, 
https://www.thefire.org/sedition-act-expires/#:~:text=Congress%20lets%20the%20Sed 
ition%20Act,malicious%E2%80%9D%20writings%20against%20the%20government  
[https://perma.cc/HM28-7MDZ]. Indeed, the common law of libel was even more draconian 
than the Sedition Act: in a civil action, presumptions about falsity and maliciousness were 
available, but absent from the federal criminal statute. Logan, Tort Law, supra, at 500–04. 
Defendants in a civil suit also had fewer due process protections than in a criminal 
prosecution, such as double jeopardy, the right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination, and the need to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brief for the 
Petitioner at 49, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39). 
 65 Wechsler had been critical of the Court’s decisions in a string of landmark civil rights 
cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 
(1959) (stating that the Court’s decisions striking down state segregation laws failed to 
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judgment stood, it would represent a grave danger to vigorous debate on 
important issues.66 The Times’s legal team filed a brief that ran for 102 pages67 
(more than twice the length allowed under the Court’s rules),68 providing an 
analytical roadmap that the Court would eventually follow.69  
Wechsler opened by arguing that the Court’s past statements about libel law 
were mere dicta because no previous case had involved a civil judgment arising 
out of criticism of the official conduct of a public official.70 He pointed to an 
array of freedom of speech and freedom of religion decisions that had provided 
increasingly broad protection to free expression and that recognized that false 
statements were not always unprotected.71 He emphasized that the Times’s 
misstatements implicated the hallowed principle that a free press “was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”72 Citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., Justice Louis Brandeis, and Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee Jr., 
Wechsler argued that unfettered political speech was essential to a democracy.73 
He characterized the Civil Rights struggle as “the major issue of our time”74 and 
analogized Sullivan’s award to a prosecution under the Sedition Act.75  
This was a bold line of argument, as few people had thought that the First 
Amendment prohibited the Sedition Act, let alone an award of damages in a 
 
reflect “neutral principles,” an essential characteristic of sound law). He also, for decades, 
defended the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, a position that he 
successfully urged on the Court while counsel for the government in Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (upholding the internment of Americans of Japanese 
ancestry during World War II). 
 66 For a fascinating dissection of Wechsler’s deft handling of the Times appeal, 
including his ability to weave technical arguments into a broader constitutional attack, see 
David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 66 ALA. L. REV. 229, 232 (2014) [hereinafter 
Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph] (“Wechsler had bad facts and bad law.”). 
 67 Brief for Petitioner, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39). 
 68 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, R. 33 (2019).  
 69 This was Wechsler’s goal: “[A] Supreme Court brief should be a document that a 
Supreme Court justice can use in writing an opinion favorable to the briefer.” LEWIS, MAKE 
NO LAW, supra note 30, at 114. 
 70 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 40–41 (“The statements cited meant no more 
than that the freedom of speech and of the press is not a universal absolute and leaves the 
States some room for the control of defamation. None of the cases sustained the repression 
as a libel of expression critical of governmental action or was concerned with the extent to 
which the law of libel may be used for the protection of official reputation.”). 
 71 E.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 30 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252, 272–73 (1941)) (holding that criticism of a judge is protected by the First Amendment 
even if the statement is false); id. at 67 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 
(1940)) (stating that false statements are a necessary byproduct of vigorous debate about 
“political belief”). 
 72 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 29 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
484 (1957)). 
 73 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 47–48, 56. 
 74 Id. at 31. 
 75 Id. at 49. 
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civil action.76 In Wechsler’s view, the negative reaction to the Act while it was 
in effect “crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First 
Amendment” which “was the central lesson of the great assault on the short-
lived Sedition Act of 1798, which the verdict of history has long deemed 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”77 Because Alabama libel law required 
that all statements about a public official to be true and allowed a jury to award 
damages for untrue statements about the public performance of public officials, 
it, like the Sedition Act, impermissibly chilled the lifeblood of a democracy: 
political speech.78  
Wechsler recognized that a majority of the Court might not accept the 
broadest implications of his position—that people were absolutely free to 
publish false statements about public officials—let alone overturn centuries of 
state common law.79 There were available, however, narrower First Amendment 
attacks. One possibility was striking the generous common law damages rules 
that allowed Sullivan to recover $500,000 without any proof that the 
misstatements caused him any harm.80 Wechsler also argued that a false 
statement that did not name a public official should not be actionable.81 Finally, 
Wechsler argued that Sullivan’s award could be invalidated by changing the 
strict liability nature of libel to require that a public official prove that the 
defendant knew the statement was “unfounded,” in other words, to require proof 
of “actual malice,” essentially adopting as a constitutional rule a broad version 
of the common law privilege of fair comment.82  
 
 76 LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 118. 
 77 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 30, 45–46. 
 78 Id. at 50–51 (opining that Alabama libel law could make “the daily dialogue of 
politics . . . utterly impossible”). Wechsler’s focus on seditious libel also allowed the Court 
to leave for another day whether the First Amendment also protects misstatements made 
about well-known people who are not affiliated with the government (later termed “public 
figures”), the private conduct of public officials, or people who are neither “public officials” 
nor “public figures” (“private plaintiffs”). 
 79 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 52 (“If this submission overstates the scope 
of constitutional protection, it surely does so only in denying that there may be room for the 
accommodation of the two ‘conflicting interests’ represented by official reputation and the 
freedom of political expression.”). 
 80 Id. at 66. For example, the Court could have limited public officials to damages if 
there was proof of “actual, proved financial injury.” LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, 
at 607. After raising this possibility in the brief, Wechsler did not pursue it. See Anderson, 
Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 66, at 235 (“Wechsler approached the no-harm [damages] 
argument warily. . . . He made no further mention of the issue.”). 
 81 See Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 66, at 234, 236. 
 82 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 31, 53–55. The majority of states provided 
defendants a privilege when they published a defamatory comment if the underlying facts 
were true. In such cases, the plaintiff could then “defeat the privilege” by proof of “malice” 
toward the plaintiff, that is, that the defendant was guilty of “bad faith.” The minority rule 
provided the privilege when both the comment and the underlying facts were false, again, as 
long as there was no ill-will toward the plaintiff. Wechsler urged the Court to adopt the more 
speech-protective minority position but he added an important twist absent from the case 
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Wechsler’s brief was well received by the Court83 and oral argument 
reflected the justices’ deep unease with the huge award and the risk that the 
common law of libel unduly chilled discussion of public affairs.84 It was also 
clear, though, that the justices were concerned with the broad implications of 
Wechsler’s positions.85 When the justices met in conference, there was a 
consensus that the verdict would not stand, but deep disagreement about how to 
get to that result.86 At the end of the initial conference, all that was clear was 
that Sullivan’s verdict had to be reversed.87 
Chief Justice Earl Warren assigned Associate Justice William Brennan the 
task of drafting a majority opinion.88 Over the next month, Brennan produced 
eight drafts that drew the support of five other justices but only concurrences 
from the remaining three, who argued for an absolute privilege.89 Wechsler’s 
brief greatly influenced Brennan’s draft opinions, which featured extended 
discussion of the Sedition Act90 and the centrality of political speech to the 
meaning of the First Amendment.91 Recognizing, as Wechsler had, the danger 
 
law: the privilege would be lost upon proof of the defendant’s bad attitude toward the truth 
(that is, that the defendant published despite knowing that the statement was false). 
Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 66, at 240–42 (Wechsler’s “reading of the 
common law rule was important, if not entirely ingenuous . . . ”). 
 83 See Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 66, at 245. Indeed, on the day of oral 
argument, Justice Arthur Goldberg spotted Dr. King in the courtroom and had an assistant 
get him an autograph. LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: JUSTICE WILLIAM 
J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 12 (2014). 
 84 See LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 134–35. 
 85 See id. at 130–35. 
 86 Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 66, at 245. Because only justices attend 
conference, there are no transcripts of the discussions. However, historians have access to 
the notes kept by some justices, and other justices have on occasion shared their 
recollections. Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1668–
69 (2013). 
 87 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 162–64. For a thorough analysis of Wechsler’s 
lawyering, see generally Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, supra note 66. 
 88 Warren apparently thought that Brennan could build a consensus on the Court, a role 
he would come to play throughout his career. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE 
BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 223–24 (2010) (“Warren . . . knew that Brennan could build 
and hold on to a majority—a unanimous one if possible—in a way that he or other justices 
could not.”). 
 89 Brennan’s effort to build consensus is ably discussed in LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra 
note 83, at 17–27. 
 90 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–76 (1964); see Anderson, Wechsler’s 
Triumph, supra note 66, at 245. 
 91 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 269–72; see also Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. 
Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to the “Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1983) [hereinafter Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan] (“It 
takes nothing from Justice Brennan to recognize, as anyone who looks into it must, that his 
transforming analysis of what that libel judgment meant for freedom of expression was based 
on the brief and argument of Professor Wechsler.”). 
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to robust political debate presented by the common law of libel,92 Brennan 
zeroed in on one of the options suggested by Wechsler—eliminating strict 
liability, and adopted a rule that made a public official suing for misstatements 
concerning his official conduct prove “actual malice”—that is, that the 
defendant published the statement “with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”93 Brennan also agreed with 
Wechsler on the much narrower ground that the judgment could not stand 
because the advertisement did not name Sullivan.94  
Brennan also proposed procedural shields that had been discussed among 
the justices. One was requiring Sullivan to prove his case with “convincing 
clarity” (rather than the typical standard of preponderance of the evidence).95 
Also, Brennan was concerned that the inflamed environment in Alabama made 
the same result on retrial inevitable,96 so he added two more constitutional rules: 
libel verdicts on behalf of public officials for misstatements arising out of their 
official conduct would no longer be reviewed with the deference typically 
accorded jury determinations of fact and that the Court would perform an 
independent review of the record.97 With this mix of substantive and procedural 
changes, the Court concluded that Sullivan’s evidence was deficient as a matter 
of constitutional law.98 In sum, in this one remarkable opinion, the Court struck 
down centuries of libel law and put in place multiple protections to encourage 
public debate about public issues.99 
The decision was saluted for its path-breaking recognition that political 
speech is at the heart of the First Amendment and that a free press needs robust 
protections to survive, let alone thrive.100 The opinion was “a bold thrust 
forward,”101 “significant,”102 and even “revolutionary.”103 University of 
 
 92 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271–72, 277–79. 
 93 Id. at 279–80. This was a position urged in Wechsler’s brief. See Brief for Petitioner, 
supra note 67, at 53–54.  
 94 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 288–89. 
 95 Id. at 285–86; C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, 
and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 
259 (1993). 
 96 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 178–79. 
 97 Id. 
 98 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 284–92. 
 99 Id. at 292 (“Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government 
will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at 
the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression.”). Three Justices 
concurred arguing for an absolute privilege. Id. at 293 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., 
concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring in result). 
 100 See Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 608. 
 101 ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 102 (1968). 
 102 Barry Mason, Comment, Defamation of Public Officials—Free Speech and the New 
Constitutional Standard, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1420, 1421 (1965). 
 103 Samuel Gray McNamara, Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional 
Limitations on State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1455 (1965). 
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Chicago law professor Harry Kalven, Jr., wrote that the decision “may prove to 
be the best and most important [opinion the Court] has ever produced in the 
realm of freedom of speech”104 and “[t]he theory of the freedom of speech 
clause was put right side up for the first time.”105 Political philosopher 
Alexander Meiklejohn considered the decision “an occasion for dancing in the 
streets.”106 For his part, Justice Brennan later recognized that by grounding First 
Amendment protections in political democracy the Court could anchor free 
speech and free press law on a more conceptually and historically accurate 
ground than the “clear and present danger” and “balancing” tests that had 
dominated the landscape for decades.107  
Keen observers at the time made an additional point. Because New York 
Times was based upon a commitment to robust debate about public affairs, 
subsequent cases could extend First Amendment protections beyond the 
confines of libel claims brought by public officials like Sullivan.108 As Professor 
Kalven wrote, the opinion presented an “invitation to follow a dialectic 
progression from public official to government policy to public policy to matters 
in the public domain, like art, [that] seems to me to be overwhelming.”109 He 
was correct, as the next decade saw the Court decide an array of cases applying 
constitutional principles well beyond damages actions arising out of false 
statements directed at the official conduct of top government officials, reaching 
criminal libel cases,110 as well as civil claims brought by low-level public 
employees,111 well-known people not government officials (“public 
figures”),112 candidates for elective office,113 and even people who are not well-
known and have no affiliation with the government (“private figures”).114  
In retrospect, New York Times seems like an easy case for constitutional 
intervention: an enormous jury award for minimally harmful statements about 
an unnamed public official regarding a critical issue facing our country, 
especially with multiple similar claims in the pipeline that threatened a major 
 
 104 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 194 (1964). 
 105 Id. at 208. 
 106 Id. at 221 n.125. 
 107 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation 
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1965); Kalven, supra note 104, at 213–
18. 
 108 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335–37 (1974) (noting that later 
opinions extended application to criticism of “public figures” and “to defamatory falsehoods 
relating to private persons”). 
 109 Kalven, supra note 104, at 221. 
 110 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67–74 (1964). 
 111 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83–87 (1966). 
 112 See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967). 
 113 See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971). 
 114 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337, 351–52 (1974). 
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publisher with crippling damages awards.115 In the next decade the Court went 
much further, constitutionalizing virtually all of the state law of defamation116 
and although there was some flagging of enthusiasm as Court personnel changed 
(at one point three justices even questioned the core “actual malice” holding),117 
by 1988, all justices had come to view New York Times and its progeny as 
bedrock free speech law.118  
With defamation law largely unchanged in the years since,119 now is a good 
time to take stock of this revolutionary law reform effort. The next section 
details the doctrinal rules that the Court adopted and identifies a number of 
alternatives that the Court could have adopted, many of which would have 
encouraged robust speech while better deterring lies and thus better protecting 
our democracy. 
III. WHAT NEW YORK TIMES DID (AND WHAT IT COULD HAVE DONE) 
The common law of defamation was very protective of reputations: in many 
circumstances, a jury could award substantial damages without the plaintiff 
proving that the offending statement was false, that the defendant was guilty of 
some degree of fault, or that the misstatement actually caused the plaintiff any 
harm.120 New York Times and its progeny stripped plaintiffs of these protections 
and remade defamation law in a dizzying array of ways.  
A. Changes to the Substantive Law of Defamation 
The best-known substantive change to defamation law is the core holding 
of New York Times: a public official could no longer recover damages absent 
proof of a high degree of culpability on the part of the publisher.121 With this 
 
 115 John C. P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice 
White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1476–78 (2003); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 891–92 (1984). 
 116 New York Times also became the basis for extending First Amendment protections 
to other torts, “including false light invasion of privacy, publication of private facts, the right 
of publicity (or appropriation), and [the] intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Rodney 
A. Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First Amendment Law, 24 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 437, 458 (2019). 
 117 See SACK, supra note 33, at 1–20. 
 118 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988), is virtually a paean to New York Times. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language, 
and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1990) 
(stating that the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court was an “unequivocal affirmation of the 
vitality of Sullivan,” as he “took pains to reaffirm a broad reading of New York Times v. 
Sullivan and its progeny”) (footnotes omitted). 
 119 SACK, supra note 33, at 1-2. 
 120 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 986 
(2d ed. 2016). 
 121 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). The Court’s decisions 
have left unclear whether any of the constitutional protections apply when the plaintiff is a 
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holding, the Court went well beyond the common law privilege of “fair 
comment,” deeming it insufficient for the “breathing space” needed to protect 
speech closely linked to self-governance.122 This meant that plaintiffs who were 
considered “public officials” had to prove that the defendant published the 
falsehood with “actual malice,”123 a very demanding standard.124 The “actual 
malice” standard is satisfied only when a defendant publishes a misstatement 
intentionally or with reckless disregard for whether the statement was truthful, 
a proof requirement later extended to claims brought by “public figures.”125  
While the Court set the culpability bar very high for claims brought by 
“public plaintiffs,” it viewed the balance of policies differently when a claim 
was brought by “private plaintiffs,” who were allowed to recover upon proof of 
mere negligence.126  
The Court also read the First Amendment as prohibiting liability for 
statements “that cannot be proved false” or that “cannot ‘reasonably [be] 
interpreted as stating actual facts.’”127 Finally, New York Times and subsequent 
decisions made it clear that a public official identified only by job title or 
membership in a group cannot recover for defamation because a criticism of the 
government generally cannot be the basis for a defamation claim by an 
individual.128 
 
private plaintiff and the suit involves a matter not of “public concern,” brought against a non-
media defendant. See SACK, supra note 33, at 1-22 to 1-23. 
 122 See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271–72, 278–83, 292. 
 123 Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251–52 (1974) (stating that “actual 
malice” is a “term of art” in defamation law). 
 124 Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth 
in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L. REV. 887, 917 (2005) (stating 
that “actual malice” is a “demanding” standard); accord Grzelak v. Calumet Publ’g Co., 543 
F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1975); see also McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 727 P.2d 711, 727 (Cal. 
1986) (stating that “actual malice” is a “formidable barrier”). 
 125 SACK, supra note 33, § 5:5.1. 
 126 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–43 (1974). The Court did not specify 
a negligence standard, rather allowing the states to set their own level of culpability: “so long 
as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard . . . for a publisher . . . of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.” Id. at 347. Most states have adopted a negligence standard. SACK, supra note 
33, at 6-2. 
 127 SACK, supra note 33, at 1-41. This is similar, but not identical, to the notion that there 
is a “wholesale defamation exception for [any statement] that might be labeled ‘opinion,’” a 
position the Court rejected in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990). See 
David A. Logan, Of “Sloppy Journalism,” “Corporate Tyranny,” and Mea Culpas: The 
Curious Case of Moldea v. New York Times, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 163–66 (1995) 
(“[B]y 1990 every federal circuit and the courts of at least thirty-six states and the District of 
Columbia recognized that a statement of opinion was absolutely protected.”). 
 128 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 4:40:50 (noting that a criticism of government “may not 
constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental 
operations was a libel of an official responsible for those operations. The Court in Rosenblatt 
thus reaffirmed that ‘[t]here must be evidence showing that the attack was read as specifically 
directed at the plaintiff’”). 
776 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:5 
1. The Flawed “Actual Malice” Standard 
There have been many criticisms of the substantive changes wrought by 
New York Times and its progeny, but three are the most powerful. 
First is concern with the sweep of New York Times, which in a single opinion 
constitutionalized the “of and concerning” element of a defamation case, 
imposed scienter requirements where the common law imposed none, and 
created a constitutional requirement of proof of “actual malice” instead of 
adopting the doctrine of common law malice.129 Later decisions further gutted 
the common law with little solicitude for the historical work of the common law 
courts,130 let alone federalism concerns.131 As Justice White wrote in his dissent 
in Gertz, looking back on New York Times and its progeny, the Court erred when 
it “federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional in 
important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 
States,”132 while “scuttling the libel laws of the States in such wholesale 
fashion.”133 Simply stated, the Court could have mitigated the free speech 
concerns implicated by libel judgments against public officials, not to mention 
avoided adopting principles that have been rejected in other democracies,134 by 
 
 129 Id. at 2-191. The Court claimed that “actual malice” was recognized by a number of 
states, but later decisions make clear that federal “actual malice” is only distantly related to 
any state law analogue. See David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. 
L. REV. 422, 427, 429 (1975). Besides failing to adopt the common law malice rule, the 
Court, unfortunately, selected a term that had a different meaning in the common law. SACK, 
supra note 33, at 5-86, n.487. The Court has recognized that its terminology has caused 
unnecessary confusion. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510–11 
(1991) (warning against the confusing “common law” malice and “actual malice”); see also 
Harte-Hanks Commuc’ns. v. Connaughton, Inc., 491 U.S. 657, 666 n.7 (1989) (noting that 
“actual malice” is a confusing term because “it has nothing to do with bad motives or ill 
will”). 
 130 See generally James Maxwell Koffler, The Pre-Sullivan Common Law Web of 
Protection Against Political Defamation Suits, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 153 (2018) (surveying 
hundreds of lower court decisions that provided protection from libel claims within the 
context of common law doctrine). 
 131 See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 782, 786 (1986) (“If the tort of defamation represents a delicate balance [between free 
speech and the need to protect reputations] then the Supreme Court should tread carefully 
where so many common law judges have trodden before.”); Jonathan C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the Common Law of Torts, 
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 441 (2016) (“Nonetheless, during an era in which arguments 
grounded in federalism are supposedly taken seriously, the virtual absence of any serious 
criticism of the Court’s First Amendment torts decisions [since New York Times] is 
startling.”).  
 132 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 902 
(2006) (explaining that the Court adopted “the extraordinarily press-protective and plaintiff-
restrictive ‘actual malice’ rule, a rule endorsed by no country in the world in the ensuing 
forty years”). 
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adopting a more surgical substantive standard, one that better balanced free 
speech concerns with the need to deter falsehoods.135 
The primary focus of critics is the requirement that all public plaintiffs prove 
“actual malice.”136 The Court was clear that it wanted to deter defamation 
actions by making “actual malice” hard to prove,137 but by doing so the Court 
excessively devalued the important state interest in protecting reputations, as 
well as harming the social cohesion of the community at large, which is 
protected by defamation law.138 Requiring that plaintiffs prove “actual malice” 
created an “open season” for targeting the reputations of individuals who choose 
 
 135 The Court’s internal deliberations initially focused on overturning the Alabama 
decision on the narrow basis that the plaintiff was not named in the offending publication. 
See LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 120–21, 172–81. Alternatively, the Court could 
have required proof of “actual malice” only when the plaintiff is a public official, not “public 
figures” more generally. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) 
(suggesting that because claims by public figures do not implicate seditious libel concerns, 
they should be able to prevail upon proof of the lesser standard of “highly unreasonable 
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting 
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers”). Or, the New York Times Court could have 
circumscribed jury misbehavior by imposing limits on the availability of “presumed” or 
punitive damages, a step the Court eventually took in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (holding that a 
plaintiff cannot recover presumed or punitive damages absent proof of “actual malice”). The 
Court’s changes to damages remedies are discussed at infra notes 195–212 and 
accompanying text. Finally, the Court could have changed the requirement that plaintiffs 
prove falsity as part of their prima facie case, a position the Court eventually took in 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986). See infra notes 228–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 136 Despite the Court’s extensive deliberations, there was “an arresting quiet at the center 
of the case—specifically, in the Justices’ failure during deliberations to criticize, debate, or 
question the . . . adoption of the actual malice standard.” See, e.g., Elena Kagan, A Libel 
Story: Sullivan Then and Now, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 197, 201 (1993) (reviewing ANTHONY 
LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991)). 
 137 W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V. SULLIVAN 
8 (1989) (opining that New York Times imposes “a near-impossible burden of proof”); 
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 
247, 255–56 (1985) (noting that plaintiffs bear a heavy burden in public plaintiff defamation 
cases). 
 138 See Epstein, supra note 131, at 798, 801 (arguing that a good reputation is a property 
right); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: 
Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2011) 
(identifying a need to “secure robust and responsible participation” and “norms of respectful, 
vigorous engagement” in public life); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation 
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986) (explaining that libel 
law protects not just individual reputations but also a “good and well-ordered society”). See 
generally Michael Passaportis, Note, A Law and Norms Critique of the Constitutional Law 
of Defamation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1985 (2004) (arguing that New York Times and its progeny 
have harmed social welfare by discouraging cooperative behavior, causing “democratic 
distortion”). 
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to participate in public life.139 Because “actual malice” is a subjective 
standard,140 New York Times “immunizes those who publish charges they 
believe to be true even if the charges turn out to be false, [as well as those] who 
publish charges they (subjectively) believe to be true even if a reasonable person 
upon reasonable investigation would (objectively) not believe those charges to 
be true.”141 Simply stated, this standard “incentivizes practices that increase the 
likelihood that the press will publish injurious falsehoods.”142  
Proving “actual malice” is so daunting that it amounts to near immunity 
from liability and thus a license to publish falsehoods.143 As discussed in Part 
V, the data show that very few public plaintiffs recover substantial damages 
because the “actual malice” standard is extremely difficult to satisfy, especially 
on appeal.144 This has resulted in little deterrence of liars and a systematic 
under-protection of the right to an unsullied reputation. 
The “actual malice” standard also creates perverse incentives. To recover, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the statement was false or was 
subjectively certain of its falsity. This puts publishers to a hard choice: 
publishing without verification is the safest legal route, as an attempt to verify 
that turns up contrary information before publication can constitute reckless 
disregard for the truth and support liability. As a result, publishers are 
incentivized to do little or no fact-checking, confident that the more slipshod 
their investigation, the less likely they are to be guilty of “actual malice.”145 In 
short, under an “actual malice” regime, ignorance is bliss.146 
 
 139 BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 7-11 (2d ed. 2019) (noting that public 
officials complained that New York Times and its progeny gave the press “a virtual license 
to defame public servants who, in turn, were virtually defenseless”). See generally RUSSELL 
L. WEAVER, ANDREW T. KENYON, DAVID F. PARTLETT, & CLIVE P. WALKER, THE RIGHT TO 
SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION, AND FREE SPEECH (2006) (stating that New York 
Times and its progeny have “effectively ended” civil defamation litigation by public 
officials). 
 140 Harte-Hanks Commc’ns., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989); see also 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979) (“actual malice” “focus[es] on the conduct and 
state of mind of the defendant”). 
 141 Fredrick Schauer, Slightly Guilty, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 93 (1993) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Slightly Guilty]. 
 142 Benjamin Barron, A Proposal to Rescue New York Times v. Sullivan by Promoting 
a Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007). 
 143 See Schauer, Slightly Guilty, supra note 141, at 94 (noting that “at least as to public 
officials and public figures, there is little room between the actual malice rule and a ‘no 
liability’ rule”). 
 144 See infra notes 318–38and accompanying text. 
 145 See Ronald A. Cass, Weighing Constitutional Anchors: New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan and the Misdirection of First Amendment Doctrine, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 399, 
409–10 (2014). Stated differently, “[t]he more a reporter investigates, the more likely it is 
that the reporter will discover some information that casts the veracity of the story into doubt, 
which would increase the likelihood of liability.” Barron, supra note 142, at 85. 
 146 See William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, 
and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 185 (1994) (“The actual malice standard not 
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It can also be argued that the “actual malice” requirement discourages 
investigation of the accuracy of stories that have already been published when 
the individuals named in the stories have attracted public attention and become 
“public figures,” increasing the chance that the daunting “actual malice” 
requirement will be triggered.147 A similar disincentive to investigate before 
publishing comes from the Court’s recognition that competitive pressures in the 
news marketplace allow a defendant to cite deadline concerns as a justification 
for failing to investigate.148 This is especially pernicious with the rise of the 
twenty-four-hour news cycle149 and the fevered hothouse that is social media.150 
“Actual malice” may also be a faulty standard from an economic 
perspective. First, “actual malice” is expensive to litigate. The parties must 
engage in extensive pretrial discovery to establish the defendant’s state of mind 
and this often requires disruptive forays deep into the editorial process.151 The 
“actual malice” requirement also incentivizes defendants, especially those who 
are insured, to pull out all the stops to avoid a crushing award.152 And scholars 
from a broad range of perspectives have questioned whether requiring “actual 
 
only holds that there is no need to investigate; it suggests that it often is better not to 
investigate.”). 
 147 Barron, supra note 142, at 87. 
 148 Bloom, supra note 137, at 267–70. 
 149 See David A. Logan, All Monica, All of the Time: The 24-Hour News Cycle and the 
Proof of Culpability in Libel Actions, 23 U. ARK. L. REV. 201, 211–13 (2000) [hereinafter 
Logan, All Monica]. 
 150 Luis W. Tompros, Richard A. Crudo, Alexis Pfeiffer, & Rachel Boghossian, The 
Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social Networking Sites in a Post-
Alvarez, Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 67 (2017) (“Hyperbole, 
embellishment, practical jokes, rumors, catfishing, and even malicious lies and threats are 
not uncommon on social media. Indeed, it is well documented that social media led to a more 
cavalier attitude about the truth; social media’s veil of actual (or perceived) anonymity 
allows subscribers to more aggressively spread falsehoods.”); Benedict Cary, How Fiction 
Becomes Fact on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/20/health/social-media-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/MY9W-YJPY] (detailing 
how the “interaction of the technology with our common, often subconscious 
psychological . . . makes so many of us vulnerable to misinformation”). 
 151 See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1633, 1667–69 (2013) (stating that New York Times “interposed an extremely fact-intensive, 
discovery-intensive—which is to say, very costly—standard into defamation litigation”); 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 
DUKE L.J. 855, 917 n.323 (2000) (stating that the Court’s focus on the defendant’s state of 
mind results in expensive and intrusive discovery and results in undue judicial interference 
with the editorial process). 
 152 See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 
515–16 (1991) [hereinafter Anderson, Libel Law] (stating that legal fees constitute almost 
80% of the legal costs of libel litigation). 
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malice” makes sense from an efficiency standpoint153 as it protects the 
publishers least concerned with accuracy.154  
Besides creating a disruptive and expensive litigation process, the “actual 
malice” requirement undoubtedly affects plaintiffs’ ability to retain competent 
counsel: few experienced lawyers will take a contingent-fee case when the odds 
of a successful outcome are as poor as they are in modern defamation law, 
further reducing the chance that defamation law deters the publication of 
falsehoods.155  
Most importantly, the Court’s sweeping protection of defendants imposes 
costs beyond the inability to protect reputations: by inadequately deterring false 
speech, the ability of citizens to effectively self-govern is compromised.156 
Justice White, who became a critic of the “actual malice” rule, put it bluntly:  
The New York Times rule . . . countenances two evils: first, the stream of 
information about public officials and public affairs is polluted and often 
remains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation and 
professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by 
falsehoods. . . . In terms of the First Amendment and reputational interests at 
stake, these seem grossly perverse results.157 
Faced with torrents of misinformation, citizens risk reaching ill-informed 
decisions about the wisdom of policies or the credibility of leaders. As Richard 
Epstein presciently observed,  
The level of discourse over public issues is not simply a function of the total 
amount of speech. It also depends on the quality of the speech. If there is no 
law of defamation, then the mix between truthful and false statements will shift. 
More false statements will be made. The public will then be required to 
discount the information that it acquires because it can be less sure of its 
pedigree. The influence of the press will diminish as there will be no obvious 
 
 153 See Kendrick, supra note 151, at 1680 (summarizing economic critiques of various 
libel regimes). 
 154 See Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law After New York Times: An 
Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 69, 100–
02 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989). 
 155 Id. at 83 (suggesting that the “actual malice” requirement “alters the attractiveness of 
contingency fee arrangements [and] should cause attorneys to decline more cases that might 
be fair bets to be remunerative,” resulting in fewer plaintiffs being “able to secure 
representation”); see also Jonathan Garret Erwin, Can Deterrence Play a Positive Role in 
Defamation Law?, 19 REV. LITIGATION 675, 695 (2000) (stating that “actual malice” is 
“especially difficult to prove [with the result that] the prospect of recovery is so slim that 
lawyers will be reluctant to take the case”). 
 156 Cass R. Sunstein, The Dark Side of New York Times v. Sullivan, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-03-25/the-
dark-side-of-new-york-times-v-sullivan [https://perma.cc/U97U-2K4A]. 
 157 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) 
(White, J., concurring). 
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way to distinguish the good reports from the bad, in part because no one can 
ever be held legally accountable for their false statements.158  
A similar concern was expressed by then-Professor Elena Kagan, who 
questioned whether “uninhibited defamatory comment [is] an unambiguous 
social good” and expressed concern that the Court’s post-New York Times 
decisions served to “distort public debate” and thus harm “public discourse” and 
the “democratic process.”159  
This concern is borne out by troubling evidence that people respond to 
uncertainty about the veracity of news sources by disengaging from civic life 
altogether. Almost two-thirds of U.S. adults report that fabricated news stories 
create confusion about current issues and events.160 As a result, millions of 
Americans now find it is difficult to know whether the information they 
encounter is accurate,161 which creates voter confusion.162 All told, the 
requirement of proof of “actual malice” may actually be at cross-purposes with 
the link between free speech and democracy, harming the quality of debate in 
the modern public square.163 
“Actual malice” is no longer a democracy-enhancing doctrine and as a result 
it should be replaced by an alternative that better balance reputations with the 
need to deter false statements in our public debate. The most familiar alternative 
to “actual malice” would be to require that public plaintiffs prove that the 
defamatory statement was published with fault or negligence; this is the scienter 
 
 158 See Epstein, supra note 131, at 799–800; see also Barron, supra note 142, at 101–02 
(the publication of false information “inhibits the public’s ability to make informed political 
choices”). See generally James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of 
Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892 
(1984) (arguing that democracy requires voters to have access to accurate information about 
public affairs and political candidates). 
 159 Kagan, supra note 136, at 206; see also LEE BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 
26–39 (1991). 
 160 Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell, & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe Fake 
News Is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.journalism.org/20 
16/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/UB 
U3-4WT8].  
 161 Nicholas Riccardi & Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC/USAFacts Poll: Americans 
Struggle to ID True Facts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/ap-
norc-usa-facts-poll-132439294.html [https://perma.cc/F7GK-4JNU] (47% believe it is 
difficult to know whether the information they encounter is true, and almost 60% say they 
regularly see conflicting accounts of the same set of facts).  
 162 Sabrina Tavernise & Aidan Gardnier, ‘No One Believes Anything’: Voters Worn Out 
by Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/ 
18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/7QVP-ZXPR] (“Just when information 
is needed most, to many Americans it seems the most elusive. The rise of social media; the 
proliferation of information online, including news designed to deceive; and a flood of 
partisan news are leading to a general exhaustion with news itself.”). 
 163 These harms are accentuated by the explosive growth of social media, a phenomenon 
discussed in more detail infra notes 279–335, and accompanying text. 
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standard used in some defamation cases164 and in the vast majority of personal 
injury actions.165 The concept of negligence, like intent (and unlike “actual 
malice”), is deeply imbedded in the common law and familiar to judges, so its 
adoption would have avoided much of the litigation (and client uncertainty) 
caused by the whole-cloth nature of “actual malice.”166 In particular, pegging 
the defamation system to negligence would harness the “wisdom of crowds,” 
hastening the development of professional norms (also called “journalistic 
ethics”) that synthesize the behavior of thousands of similarly situated reporters. 
This would help courts identify, and juries apply, journalistic norms based on 
an external, industry-wide standard, just as is done in medical malpractice 
actions.167 
However, it is not surprising that the Court did not adopt a negligence 
regime. Most basically, a negligence standard would not have protected the New 
York Times from the wrath of the Alabama jury;168 by failing to do any 
investigation of the advertisement, almost any jury anywhere would have found 
the newspaper liable, and thus subject to a potentially huge damages award. 
More broadly, a negligence standard would provide publishers too little 
“breathing space”—the central goal of the Court in New York Times—because 
it may be too easy to prove, especially when the trial involves a popular local 
plaintiff and an unpopular defendant.169 Thus, a negligence standard risks 
unduly chilling speech that has the most value—statements about public 
officials involved in a matter of public concern—and would have been 
unacceptable to the justices. Indeed, a negligence regime apparently was never 
even considered by counsel or the Court.170 
 
 164 Negligence on the part of the publisher could nullify a defendant’s claim of 
conditional privilege. See SACK, supra note 33, at 9-55–9-57. 
 165 “Negligence claims represent the great majority of tort claims presented, brought, or 
tried today.” DOBBS, HAYDEN, & BUBLICK, supra note 120, at 187. 
 166 In fact, the Court adopted such a compromise position in Gertz when it required that 
private plaintiffs prove “at least fault.” SACK, supra note 33, at 9-55, 56 n.244. 
 167 See Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial 
Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 18 (1994). It is unclear that constitutional 
protections should be extended to defamation claims brought against “citizen journalists.” 
See also Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth 
Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 44-48 (2011). 
 168 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times v. Sullivan, in FIRST 
AMENDMENT STORIES 229, 230 (2012) (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 
2012) (suggesting the Court’s decision “may have been an overreaction to a particularly bad 
set of facts in a charged political atmosphere”). 
 169 SACK, supra note 33, at 9-55 (stating that a negligence standard risks “hindsight 
judgments that are unlikely to give a hesitant speaker the confidence for him or her to speak 
out”); accord Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: 
Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 841–43 (1984) (identifying how a 
negligence standard provides insufficient protection). 
 170 See LEVINE & WERMEIL, supra note 83, at 18–30 (discussing the justices’ debates 
about changing the strict liability nature of defamation law with no justice urging a 
negligence standard). 
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Instead of requiring either “actual malice” or negligence, the Court could 
have achieved a better balance by adopting a scienter requirement of “highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”171 
This approach, or the analogous test used under New York law—“gross 
irresponsibility”172—is more objective than the “actual malice” standard, which 
solely focuses on state of mind and whether the publisher knowingly lied.173 A 
“highly unreasonable” standard could drive down the time and expense 
associated with discovery174 and lessen the intrusiveness into the editorial 
process.175 Such an adjustment would also facilitate accurate decision-making 
by juries, which would be directed to consider whether the defendant conformed 
to “journalistic standards,” something not important under an “actual malice” 
regime.176 Similarly, if liability were pegged to a less demanding standard than 
“actual malice,” verdicts could be based on examples of extreme departures 
from the journalistic norm, such as a total failure to investigate, which would 
give publishers an incentive to take at least minimal steps to confirm accuracy 
 
 171 This was the position urged by Justice Harlan in cases involving public figures, as 
opposed to public officials, because it would “balance with fair precision the competing 
views at stake.” Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Justice Harlan summarized his proposed approach as supporting liability if an 
“investigation . . . was grossly inadequate in the circumstances.” Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 156 (1967). 
 172 The Court’s decision in Gertz allowed states to set the basis for liability in private 
figure cases as long as they do not impose strict liability. Some states, including New York, 
require proof that the defendant published with “gross irresponsibility.” Chapadeau v. Utica 
Observer-Dispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. 1975). This standard is considered the 
equivalent of the “highly unreasonable conduct” standard proposed by Justice Harlan but 
never adopted by a majority of the Court. See Murchison, supra note 167, at 18. The New 
York approach is discussed in detail in David E. McCraw, Press Freedom and Private 
People: The Life and Times (and Future) of Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 74 ALB. 
L. REV. 841 (2010–11). 
 173 See SACK, supra note 33, at 5-82 (stating that “actual malice” is “virtually unrelated 
to ‘recklessness’ in the ordinary sense: gross negligence or ‘wanton behavior’”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 174 Murchison, supra note 167, at 18 (suggesting that unlike with “actual malice,” the 
plaintiff could prove liability by comparing the defendant’s conduct to the practices of 
competent journalists); accord Bloom, supra note 137, at 345–46 (suggesting that courts that 
apply a “gross irresponsibility” standard will require proof of “a greater departure from the 
standard of due care in the journalism profession than will simple negligence jurisdictions 
because the term ‘gross irresponsibility,’ on its face, suggests error of a more egregious 
nature than mere negligence”). 
 175 Anderson, Libel Law, supra note 152, at 516–21 (discussing the many ways the 
“actual malice” requires inquiry into the editorial process). 
 176 Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667–68 (1989) (stating 
that although a deviation from professional journalistic standards is not required to prove 
“actual malice,” such a deviation may be admissible). 
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rather than publish first and (maybe) verify later.177 In sum, the Court should 
have adopted a scienter requirement located between fault and “actual malice” 
to better balance the competing interests at play and lessen the flow of 
falsehoods into our public debate. 
2. The Excessive Sweep of the “Actual Malice” Requirement 
The second main critique of the “actual malice” standard involves the range 
of people saddled with proving “actual malice.” In New York Times, the Court 
imposed the “actual malice” requirement on plaintiffs who were “public 
officials.” The Court’s justification for this change was largely based on its view 
that the Sedition Act of 1798, a law that applied only to top federal officials, 
was unconstitutional.178 While the Court has stated that the “actual malice” 
requirement “cannot be thought to include all public employees,”179 the sweep 
of the rule has been very broad and protects defendants from claims brought by 
a host of government employees far removed from the powerful targets of the 
Sedition Act.180 For example, the “public official” category includes candidates 
for any office, based on the view that by running they voluntarily places their 
character and behavior before the public for consideration.181 This creates 
disincentives for citizens to enter the electoral process and also makes public 
service less attractive to those already serving in government.182  
 
 177 Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 871 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“[I]t is 
well settled that failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice.”); see 
also SACK, supra note 33, § 5:5.2[A] at 5-94 (listing cases describing the myriad ways to 
establish evidence of actual malice); id. § 5:5.2[B] at 5-95 (identifying evidence that is 
insufficient to show actual malice). 
 178 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–77 (1964) (explaining how the 
“attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history”). 
 179 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979) (dictum); see also SMOLLA, 
supra note 37, at 2-87–90 (stating that “there are relatively few examples of government-
related defamation plaintiffs who are held not to be public officials subject to the New York 
Times standard . . . usually [those who] have a peripheral or transient connection to 
governmental activity, or are extremely low in the organizational hierarchy”). 
 180 Halpern, supra note 118, at 280 (“Had the boundaries of constitutionalization of 
defamation been left where Sullivan’s Sedition Act concerns put them—at the outer 
perimeter of official conduct of broadly defined public officials—it is possible that the case 
development over the succeeding years would have produced a coherent body of judicial 
thought from which a sound doctrine of ‘constitutional malice’ might have emerged.”). 
 181 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971) (“And if it be conceded 
that the First Amendment was ‘fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,’ then it can hardly 
be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”). 
 182 SACK, supra note 33, at 5–7; see NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST 
MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 251 (1986) (tracing the colonial roots 
of this justification for the common law of libel). President Richard Nixon made a similar 
argument. ROSENBERG, supra, at 251.  
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In decisions following New York Times, the Court extended the “actual 
malice” requirement to “public figures,” plaintiffs who are well-known but not 
affiliated with the government. This means that publishers are free to publish 
false stories about many people who have no direct connection to public policy 
with scant fear of liability, and with a concomitant shrinking of the scope of 
protection of reputation, solely because the targets happen to have a degree of 
notoriety.183 This is a serious disconnect from the seditious libel justification for 
New York Times.184 
Critics have also assailed the many decisions that have defined who is a 
“public figure,”185 and especially the justifications for imposing the full array 
of constitutional requirements upon a plaintiff considered a “pervasive” or “all-
purpose” “public figure” (a person who is famous but not involved in debates 
about public policy).186 There is also the unfairness that results from treating as 
“public figures” those who get swept up in a matter of public interest 
involuntarily, but who because of the Court’s decisions, suffer damage to their 
reputations with scant opportunity to win a libel claim.187 
Finally, critics have lamented the requirement that “private figures” 
(plaintiffs who are neither “public officials” nor “public figures”) cannot take 
advantage of the strict liability nature of the common law of libel because they 
 
 183 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (plurality opinion) (“[Suits by 
public figures] cannot be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel. Neither plaintiff has 
any position in government which would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a 
vindication of governmental policy. Neither was entitled to a special privilege protecting his 
utterances against accountability in libel.”). 
 184 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 131, at 438 (“[New York Times involved] a 
transparent effort by a government official, aided by sympathetic state judges, to use civil 
litigation to punish a newspaper for publishing criticisms of official actions and 
policies. . . . The notorious common law crime of seditious libel was alive and well.”). 
 185 SACK, supra note 33, at 5-22 (“The law pursuant to which courts determine who is 
and who is not a ‘public figure,’ . . . is chaotic.”); Joseph H. King, Jr., Deux ex Machina and 
the Unfulfilled Promise of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 
95 KY. L.J. 649, 657 (2006-2007) (“[T]he boundaries and outlines of the public figure 
classification have been formless and ill-defined.”). The classic formulation of this dilemma 
is “defining public figures is much like nailing a jellyfish to the wall.” Rosanova v. Playboy 
Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976). 
 186 James Corbelli, Comment, Fame and Notoriety in Defamation Litigation, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 809, 829 (1983) (“In most instances, any connection between the fame of the 
plaintiff and an actual relinquishment of the interest in an unsullied reputation is tenuous at 
best.”). 
 187 Commentators and courts have severely criticized the notion of “involuntary public 
figures.” See, e.g., Christopher Russell Smith, Dragged into the Vortex: Reclaiming Private 
Plaintiffs’ Interests in Limited Purpose Public Figure Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1421 
(2004) (arguing that courts should eliminate the involuntary limited purpose public figure 
category). Concern with the law applicable to public figures prompted Justice Clarence 
Thomas to recently urge reconsideration of the New York Times regime. See McKee v. 
Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas J., concurring in denial of a writ of certiorari) 
(criticizing the court of appeals decision, McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017), which 
held that the victim of an alleged sexual assault by comedian Bill Cosby was a public figure). 
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now have to prove “at least negligence” to prevail.188 Besides concerns with the 
wisdom of uprooting centuries of state common law,189 the Court inadequately 
balanced the relevant policies in play. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, the Court 
distinguished public from private plaintiffs because of the “compelling 
normative consideration” that a private plaintiff has not assumed the risk of 
calumny.190 This contention is flawed because it ignores the requirement of 
“actual voluntariness” central to the tort defense of assumption of the risk.191 
Also, by requiring that all defamed plaintiffs, even those with no connection to 
government and without a public profile, prove fault in defamation actions, the 
Court imposed a form of tax on innocent people for the perceived greater good 
of unfettered discussion.192  
The Gertz Court further justified its changes to the common law by the fact 
that private plaintiffs lacked access to channels of communication for 
rebuttal.193 If that was true when Gertz was decided in 1974, it is not true today, 
when a defamed person can often engage in self-help by mounting a defense on 
the internet.194  
B. Changes to the Remedies for Defamation 
Consistent with its zealous protection of reputations, the common law 
provided plaintiffs with very generous damages rules that were fundamentally 
 
 188 Gertz held that states were free to set the culpability standard for private plaintiffs, 
“so long as they do not impose liability without fault.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 340 (1974). 
 189 See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (“[An individual who seeks government office] runs the 
risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”). 
 191 See Susan M. Gilles, From Baseball Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the 
Risk in Tort Law and Constitutional Libel Law, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 231, 237–60 (2002). The 
concept of assumption of the risk makes even less sense when applied to claims brought by 
“pervasive” or “general purpose public figures,” who may be well-known in general but who 
may not have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order 
to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” Id. at 252. For example, should the fact 
that millions of people recognize the name of NBA star LeBron James strip him of the right 
to effectively protect his reputation from falsehoods? 
 192 See Epstein, supra note 131, at 798 (“Defamation suits impose a price on those who 
make false statements about others. Repeal of the law of defamation dramatically reduces 
that price, given that all administrative and injunctive remedies have already been ruled out 
of bounds.”). 
 193 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 194 Arguments that are grounded in a lack of access to opportunities to rebut a false 
statement make little sense in a world of easy access to the internet and, especially, social 
media. See Barron, supra note 142, at 88–90; see also SACK, supra note 33, at 5-23 (“An 
interesting avenue of inquiry would be whether the advent of the Internet and the growth of 
the importance of social media affects or should affect the constitutionally based law of 
defamation.”). 
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inconsistent with general tort principles: as Justice Powell observed, the 
common law remedies for defamation were “an oddity of tort law.”195  
Specifically, juries had great latitude to fix compensatory damages. If the 
plaintiff could prove that the defendant had printed a defamatory statement 
about the plaintiff, the jury was free to assess substantial damages without any 
proof of harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, economic interests, or emotional state 
(and the amount awarded may be substantial, as was the case in in New York 
Times).196 The reasoning was that such harms were likely to flow from 
defamation but were difficult to prove,197 so the jury should be allowed to 
“presume damages”198—awarding whatever amount the jury thought fair and 
appropriate in the circumstances.199 This doctrine created a presumption of 
injury that for all intents and purposes was irrebuttable200 and thus was both 
unfair and illogical.201  
The common law also allowed the plaintiff to recover punitive damages 
upon proof that the false statement was motivated by malice (in the sense of ill 
will toward the plaintiff), again without any evidence of harm.202 In sum, the 
 
 195 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. 
 196 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 120, at 998; see also SMOLLA, supra 
note 37, § 9:17 (“Presumed damages are by no means merely nominal. They may at times 
be quite substantial.”). Of course, if the plaintiff had evidence of actual harm to reputation, 
the plaintiff was free to introduce if for the jury’s consideration. SACK, supra note 33, at 10-
11. 
 197 SACK, supra note 33, at 10-10; see also David A. Anderson, Reputation, 
Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 764 (1984) [hereinafter Anderson, 
Reputation]. 
 198 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITTUTION 
§ 7.2(3) (2d ed. 1993). 
 199 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (recognizing “[t]he largely 
uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages”). 
 200 See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2491 (4th ed. 1985); see also Post, supra note 138, at 698 (noting that a 
plaintiff can recover damages absent proof of any damage; even if there was evidence of no 
harm to reputation, the plaintiff could still prevail—that is, damages are conclusively 
presumed). 
 201 Anderson, Reputation, supra note 197, at 749–50 (“Judges cannot give meaningful 
instructions when the substantive law concedes that ‘there is no legal measure of damages 
for these wrongs. The amount which the injured party ought to recover is referred to the 
sound discretion of the jury.’ As a result, the process of fixing an amount of presumed 
damages is inherently irrational.”); see also Post, supra note 138, at 706 (suggesting that “the 
common law presumption of damages, which in a market society is simply an undeserved 
windfall to the plaintiff, can be conceived as empowering juries to pursue the 
‘noncompensatory’ end of vindicating the plaintiff’s honor in the community”). 
 202 W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 845 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (noting that a 
substantial punitive award need not be supported by any damage to the plaintiff’s reputation). 
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damages rules for defamation claims were considerably more pro-plaintiff than 
those provided by tort law generally.203 
The New York Times line of cases saw the Court significantly limit the 
remedies available to defamation plaintiffs who prove liability. In New York 
Times itself, the Court recognized that the combination of strict liability and the 
generous common law damages rules constituted “a form of regulation that 
creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend 
reliance upon the criminal law.”204 A decade later, the Court focused on the 
question of remedies, concerned that the risk of large damages awards without 
any proof of injury created an unacceptable risk of stealth attacks on unpopular 
defendants.205 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court held that if “private 
figure” plaintiffs could prove only fault (as opposed to “actual malice”), they 
could no longer recover presumed damages; going forward, such a plaintiff’s 
compensatory award had to be supported by proof of “actual harm.”206 
However, if the plaintiff could prove “actual malice,” plaintiffs could take 
advantage of the common law rule of presumed damages.207 The Court also cast 
a skeptical eye on punitive damages, recognizing that “jury discretion to award 
punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-
censorship.”208 As a result, the First Amendment now requires that an award of 
presumed or punitive damages be supported by proof of “actual malice,” 
regardless of whether the plaintiff is a private or public plaintiff.209 
 
 203 See Post, supra note 138, at 706; see also Anderson, Libel Law, supra note 152, at 
513 (distinguishing libel claims from most civil actions, where “the facts of the case impose 
some finite ceiling on potential damages”). 
 204 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. 
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59 (1963)). 
 205 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (“[T]he doctrine of presumed 
damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for 
injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.”); see also Anderson, Reputation, supra 
note 197, at 750 (suggesting that “presumed damages may be more pernicious than punitive 
damages” because “punishment in the guise of presumed compensatory damages is entirely 
subterranean and, therefore, difficult to identify and control”). 
 206 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. This was an argument raised by Wechsler in his New York 
Times brief but not picked up on by the Court at the time. See supra note 79 and 
accompanying text. The Gertz Court declined to define the new damages rule but did say: 
“Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more 
customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of 
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and 
suffering.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350; see also SACK, supra note 33, § 10.3.4. 
 207 A private plaintiff may be able to recover presumed damages, even without proof of 
“actual malice,” if the claim is against a non-media defendant (for example, a credit report 
company) and involved a misstatement about a matter not of “public concern” (such as the 
financial affairs of a privately held company). Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). 
 208 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. 
 209 Because public plaintiffs already had to prove “actual malice,” Gertz only changed 
the damages rules for private figure plaintiffs. SACK, supra note 33, at 10-6. 
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Limiting punitive damages in claims brought by private plaintiffs was not 
the only option available to the Court, especially given the chill created by the 
possibility of a significant award of punitive damages in any defamation 
action.210 The Court could have gone further and totally banned punitive 
damage awards in defamation actions, a position advocated by Justice 
Marshall.211 This would have allowed plaintiffs to recover damages for actual 
harm to reputation but minimized the chilling effect on reporting on public 
affairs caused by the threat of large and essentially unconstrained punitive 
damage awards.212 
C. Changes to Procedural Defamation Law 
Finally, in its sweeping uprooting of the common law, the New York Times 
Court adopted two “sensitive tools” that fundamentally altered the procedural 
rules for defamation litigation.213 In the typical civil action, the plaintiff must 
prove factual assertions by a preponderance of the evidence, and once the fact 
finder (typically a jury) decides that the scales tip that way, the evidence is 
sufficient to support liability.214 Not so in defamation cases post-New York 
Times: a defamation plaintiff now must convince the fact finder by a new 
standard of proof, “clear and convincing evidence,”215 which is more 
demanding than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard usually applied in 
 
 210 See Jerome A. Barron, Punitive Damages in Libel Cases—First Amendment 
Equalizer?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105, 107 (1990) (discussing the how punitive damages 
in defamation actions can chill free speech and how the Supreme Court has failed to adjust 
constitutional doctrine to reflect this danger). 
 211 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Restricting the availability of punitive damages was also addressed by scholars. Barron, 
supra note 142, at 105. See generally Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a 
Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2012) 
(arguing that courts should focus on the available remedies in assessing First Amendment 
violations). 
 212 The Court did come to recognize both substantive and procedural due process limits 
on punitive damage awards in all civil actions. See Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The 
Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 530 
(2011). 
 213 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 214 Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal 
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 443–44 (2004). 
 215 Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285–86, with Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 490 (1984) (holding that the clear and convincing standard was 
a necessary adjunct to the substantive doctrine of requiring “actual malice”), and Dienes & 
Levine, supra note 95, at 260 (“The Court has fashioned a set of ancillary doctrines 
governing pretrial motions and appellate review that protect against unjustified liability and 
the threat of costly libel litigation. New York Times, for example, requires that actual malice 
be established with ‘convincing clarity,’ rather than the preponderance of the evidence 
standard typically invoked in tort cases.”). 
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civil actions (but not as demanding as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
used in criminal prosecutions).216 The Court extended the reach of this elevated 
standard to dispositive pretrial motions, like summary judgment and directed 
verdict.217  
The second procedural change involves judicial review of jury fact-finding, 
which in the typical civil action is subject to a “clearly erroneous” standard.218 
Judicial deference to lower court findings of fact is buttressed by the 
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, which limits federal 
appellate court reversal of jury findings.219 Under this system, judges generally 
must defer to jury fact-finding, on the view that laypeople are better suited than 
judges to evaluate evidence, especially the credibility of witnesses and the state 
of mind of the defendant (issues central to tort law in general).220  
The Court dramatically broke with this precedent in New York Times. After 
reversing the decision of the lower court and announcing the new “actual 
malice” requirement, the typical next step would have been to remand for a new 
trial, the result of which could be appealed.221 However, the Court was 
concerned that if the case was remanded, the racial animus infecting the 
Alabama judicial system would result in the same outcome—a huge jury award 
 
 216 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1982), 
aff’d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); see also Anderson, Origins, supra note 63, at 494–99 (discussing 
how procedural changes to the standard of proof and “independent appellate review” came 
to be recognized as distinct constitutional doctrines). 
 217 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff 
must prove “actual malice” by “clear and convincing” evidence, regardless of whether the 
judge is considering motions pretrial or post-trial). 
 218 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a)(6) provides that “[f]indings of fact, 
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the 
witnesses’ credibility.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). This means that an appellate court will 
“hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of an administrative tribunal or of a 
jury, [and] will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded.” 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); see 
also Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two 
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous.”). 
 219 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined 
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”); see 
Debra Lyn Basset, “I Lost at Trial—In the Court of Appeals!”: The Expanding Power of 
Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1136–40 (2001) 
(discussing the history of the “reexamination clause”). 
 220 Henry P. Monaghan argued that “law is for the judge/facts are for the jury” is a false 
dichotomy. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 229 
n.8, 233 (1985) (“[A]ny distinction posited between “law” and “fact” does not imply the 
existence of static, polar opposites. Rather, law and fact have a nodal quality; they are points 
of rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience.”). As an example, he cites the 
determination of whether an actor was guilty of negligence as an example of a third category, 
that of “law application.” Id. at 236. 
 221 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1121 (2020). 
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that would be affirmed by hostile state courts—chilling reporting on the Civil 
Rights Movement for at least the duration of another round of appeals.222 Citing 
the need for “effective judicial administration,”223 the Court broke with 
precedent and undertook a painstaking review of the record, which resulted in 
the conclusion that “the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the 
convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands.”224 The Court 
entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. 
This significant procedural deviation has become known as the 
“independent appellate review” doctrine, and later cases have made clear that 
the final determination of “actual malice” is an issue of law for judges to 
decide.225 This exacting standard of review—essentially de novo evaluation of 
facts—has become bedrock constitutional doctrine in the context of cases that 
implicate First Amendment concerns.226 
The final procedural uprooting of the common law involved the burden of 
proof. Before New York Times, a defamatory statement was presumed to be 
false, which meant that the defendant had to prove its truth.227 The Court flipped 
this; now a plaintiff must prove that the offending statement was false.228 
Critics have raised various concerns about the changes to the procedures for 
litigating defamation actions.  
First there is uncertainty about whether the “clear and convincing” standard 
of proof is comprehensible to lay jurors, who may struggle to appreciate the 
difference between a “preponderance of the evidence” and “clear and 
convincing evidence.” This distinction may be relatively easy for lawyers and 
judges to comprehend, but it is likely not so for laypeople.229 And uncertainty 
 
 222 This concern was justified given the racially charged atmosphere in which Sullivan’s 
claim was tried and the risk that Alabama judges would have resisted federalizing its 
common law even if directed to do so by the Supreme Court of the United States. LEWIS, 
MAKE NO LAW, supra note 30, at 23–36. Justice Black’s concurrence in New York Times 
emphasized this risk, along with that presented by the copycat cases that would follow, 
magnifying the threat to free speech. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294–95 
(1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
 223 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 284–85. 
 224 Id. at 285–86. The Court engaged in a similar searching review of the record and 
found no evidentiary support for a finding that the offending publication was “of and 
concerning” the plaintiff, who had not been named in the advertisement. Id. at 288. 
 225 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 12:86. 
 226 Ann Zobrosky, Note, Constitutional Fact Review: An Essential Exception to 
Anderson v. Bessemer, 62 IND. L.J. 1209, 1243 (1987) (discussing whether independent 
appellate review is limited to First Amendment cases). Whether independent appellate 
review is the same as de novo review is unclear. Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment 
Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 
1771–74 (1998) [hereinafter Gilles, First Amendment]. 
 227 SACK, supra note 33, at 3-2. 
 228 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 769 (1986); see also SACK, supra 
note 33, at 1-38-39. 
 229 SACK, supra note 33, § 5-142, 5-143. 
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exists even about whether trial judges will decide dispositive motions under a 
“clear and convincing” standard in a consistent manner.230 
Critics have assailed the “independent review” doctrine as a “radical 
departure”231 because it did violence to the traditional duty of juries to evaluate 
witness credibility, draw inferences from the evidence, and resolve conflicting 
evidence.232 The Court brushed aside this concern, even while admitting that 
“actual malice”—that is, actual knowledge of falsity or subjective reckless 
disregard for falsity—is a close analog to mens rea, which juries typically 
decide.233 This new doctrine is also inconsistent with the protection of jury fact-
finding enshrined in the Seventh Amendment,234 a concern that the Court 
glossed over in a footnote.235 
Another dramatic procedural reform was rejecting the centuries-old rule that 
truth is an affirmative defense to a defamation action.236 This break with the 
common law was a surprise to some observers on the view that allegations of 
defamation are analogous to criminal charges brought by the state and therefore 
should proceed on the assumption that the person about whom the offending 
 
 230 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (citing United States v. 
Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972) (a criminal case)). 
 231 Marc E. Sorini, Factual Malice: Rediscovering the Seventh Amendment in Public 
Person Libel Cases, 82 GEO. L.J. 563, 590–91 (1993). 
 232 Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries—Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury 
Verdicts, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 237, 265–98 (1989); see also Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury’s 
Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV. 189, 237 (2015) (“The jury has a unique capacity 
as a popular and legal institution to increase constitutional law’s democratic legitimacy; to 
incorporate the political morality of a wide variety of Americans, not just a professional 
class, into constitutional law; and to provide a unique opportunity for laypeople to learn 
about and participate in American constitutionalism. Additionally, trusting the jury to apply 
constitutional law is consistent with the jury’s enduring role in the American legal system as 
a source of normative content in ordinary negligence cases.”). 
 233 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498 (1984) (“It surely 
does not stretch the language of the Rule to characterize an inquiry into what a person knew 
at a given point in time as a question of ‘fact.’”); see also Martin H. Redish & William D. 
Gohl, The Wandering Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 290 (2017) 
(stating that “the constitutional fact doctrine has since wandered, often inexplicably, into 
areas in which, given its core rationale, it has no business going”). 
 234 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). 
 235 Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 n.27. Ignoring traditional scope-of-review doctrines made even 
less sense for the cornerstone of the Court’s opinion—the imposition of an “actual malice” 
requirement—than for the “of and concerning” issue, because the new scienter requirement 
had not been on the parties’ radar in the lower courts, so there had been no opportunity to 
present evidence and create a record on that issue. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in 
Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 
270–73 (1987). 
 236 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986). The Court declined to 
answer whether this change was applicable to all defamation cases or only those against a 
media defendant that involve a topic that does not involve public concern. SACK, supra note 
33, at 3-12-3-16. 
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statement was made should be deemed “innocent until proven guilty,” so to 
speak.237 Shifting the burden of proof on this issue matters greatly in cases in 
which the plaintiff has proven that the defendant is highly culpable, and it 
creates perverse incentives. As Dean Smolla has observed, 
In theory, [the Court] invites the unscrupulous publisher who does not believe 
in the truth of the story but is confident that at any trial the truth would 
ultimately prove to be unknowable to go ahead and 
publish. . . . Realistically, . . . [the Court] does surely provide safe harbor for at 
least some sloppy, unprofessional journalism.238 
In sum, the Court made significant procedural changes but failed to provide 
sufficient guidance as to “when and how courts should further substantive 
values by deviating from procedures commonly applied to all types of cases.”239 
Finally, it is useful to consider the entire package of procedural innovations 
adopted by the Court in light of the statistics, which reveal a very high rate of 
reversal by appellate courts.240 This data shows that even though the new 
procedural regime has been in place for decades, lower courts are not yielding 
decisions that are accurate (that is, in which the established facts satisfy 
constitutional requirements for the verdict reached), a problem exacerbated by 
the fact that a litigation process that necessitates appellate review is “costly and 
slow.”241  
IV. THE CHANGED PUBLIC SQUARE 
When New York Times was decided in 1964, the organized (or “mass”) 
media was the public’s primary source of information about public affairs. 
Almost every city had at least one daily newspaper, with robust circulation and 
income streams (primarily from advertising) sufficient for national outlets to 
have reporters on the ground beyond their immediate metro area and, in some 
cases, around the globe.242 Weekly magazines had strong circulations; 
 
 237 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 5:13. Stated differently, the accuser should “put up or shut 
up.” Id. 
 238 Id. at 5-18, 19. 
 239 Matheson, supra note 235, at 235; see also Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our 
Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2421 (1999) (the jury serves as the “conscience of the 
community” when it decides fact issues (including what is reasonable care in the 
circumstances) and determines witness credibility in tort cases). 
 240 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
 241 Gilles, First Amendment, supra note 226, at 1794 (opining that the Court’s package 
of procedural reforms have “severely failed”); see also Cass, Principle and Interest, supra 
note 154, at 103 (arguing that these litigation costs “consume a large portion of the savings 
conferred by the more press-protective rule”); Epstein, supra note 131, at 808–10 (arguing 
that the costs of litigation makes newspapers more risk averse in reporting). 
 242 C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2104 
(1992) (explaining that advertising often provided three-fourths of a newspaper’s revenue). 
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“weeklies” like Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report, took “a 
universal approach to the news, covering hard news items plus lifestyle, sport, 
arts, culture, and entertainment topics as well.”243  
By 1964, the three broadcast networks had built public affairs programming 
around their dinnertime news programs, which became “must-watch TV” for 
many Americans; news “anchors” became not just household names but also 
trustworthy presences invited into American living rooms.244 These networks 
and a handful of conglomerates of radio stations provided important news 
coverage.245 
This model had a number of important characteristics. First, while citizens 
could always attend public meetings and discuss the affairs of the day with 
friends and family, the mass media exercised an outsized influence on what 
information American citizens got about public affairs and thus could facilitate 
an informed electorate—a core function of the robust press recognized by New 
York Times as essential to an effective democracy. The practical impediment of 
high entry barriers to becoming a media outlet—as journalist A.J. Liebling once 
quipped, “freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one”246—
meant that the mass media of the era could broadly disseminate information far 
better than denizens of the local coffee shop or even the “lonely pamphleteer” 
and thus broadly and deeply influence public affairs.247 
Second, newspapers and magazines had relatively predictable deadlines for 
finalizing a story. Magazines had almost a week, and in some cases almost a 
month, for reporters to dig for facts and for editors to review stories for 
accuracy.248 Broadcast media (especially television) and daily newspapers also 
had a fixed production schedule; although they had a shorter time frame in 
 
 243 ALISON DAGNES, POLITICS ON DEMAND: THE EFFECTS OF 24-HOUR NEWS ON 
AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (2010). 
 244 RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American Press, 
112 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 567, 580–81 (2017); see also STEVE M. BARKIN, AMERICAN 
TELEVISION NEWS: THE MEDIA MARKETPLACE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 35–45 (2003) 
(describing an “era of network dominance” from 1963 to the 1980s). 
 245 DAGNES, supra note 243, at 45 (stating that most Americans got at least some of their 
information about public affairs from radio). 
 246 A.J. Liebling, The Wayward Press: Do You Belong in the New Journalism?, NEW 
YORKER, May 14, 1960, at 105. 
 247 See Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 704 (1972) (stating that “the liberty of the 
press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as 
much as of the large metropolitan publisher”). 
 248 Logan, All Monica, supra note 149, at 201–02; see also Susan Curie Sivek & Sharon 
Bloyd-Peshkin, Where Do Facts Matter? The Digital Paradox in Magazines’ Fact-Checking 
Practices, 12 JOURNALISM PRAC. 400, 404 (2018) (“The practice of meticulous fact-checking 
spread to other American magazines—some because they were owned by the same parent 
company as one of these fact-checking progenitors, others because these highly regarded 
magazines set the expectation that fact-checking should be part of the editorial process at 
reputable magazines.”). The New Yorker magazine in particular had a “sterling reputation 
for accuracy and . . . [a] fabled fact-checking department . . . .” Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 960 F.2d 896, 902–03 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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which to work, they nevertheless typically had a meaningful opportunity to 
exercise care in reporting.249 The existence of a block of time before publication 
also allowed for the exercise of judgment by editors,250 seasoned journalists who 
curated and checked stories, trained reporters, organized complex 
investigations, and inculcated the institution’s ethics in subordinates.251 
Third, there was relative economic stability in the media marketplace. 
Newspapers were often owned by wealthy families with deep ties to their home 
communities, so they could be relatively impervious to pressures to return a 
robust profit for shareholders.252 As a result, print media’s “legacy outlets” were 
able to survive and thrive despite the rise of broadcast news stations, which 
competed for customers with the advantage of the immediacy and immersion 
provided by sound and video.253 Broadcast outlets could operate without a 
relentless focus on the bottom line; they treated their news divisions as “loss 
leaders,” which promoted quality programming.254 These outlets could also 
afford to provide on-the-job training (later replaced by college degrees in 
journalism) that created reporters with expertise on the topics and people they 
covered on their “beats.”255  
 
 249 See Logan, All Monica, supra note 149, at 202. 
 250 “Journalistic mediation,” is the work of selecting, combining, translating, and 
presenting different pieces of information in a news story. Tomasso Venturini, Confessions 
of a Fake News Scholar or “on the Study of Subjects”, TOMASSOVENTURINI.IT (May 28, 
2018), http://www.tommasoventurini.it/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Venturini_Fake 
News_PaperICA.pdf [https://perma.cc/D34Q-6BQK]; see also DAGNES, supra note 243, at 
10 (describing “gatekeeping” and “framing” as essential characteristics of traditional 
journalism); Jonathan Rauch, The Constitution of Knowledge, NAT’L. AFF. (Fall 2018), 
https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-constitution-of-knowledge [https://per 
ma.cc/VZ5X-CR4N] (“The distinguishing characteristic of journalism is professional 
editing, and its institutional home is the newsroom, which curates and checks stories, trains 
reporters, organizes complex investigations, inculcates professional ethics, and more.”). 
 251 Rauch, supra note 250, at 134; see also Raymond J. Pingree et al., Checking Facts 
and Fighting Back: Why Journalists Should Defend Their Profession, 13 PLOS ONE 
e0208600 (2018) (“Fact checking is a crucial function of journalism in a healthy democracy 
because of its theoretical potential to hold elites accountable and keep the national debate 
grounded in shared facts.”). 
 252 See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort, Speech, and the Dubious Alchemy of State Action, 
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1171 (2015) (citations omitted) (“Historically, newspapers and 
local television and radio stations were organized as closely held corporations, often owned 
by local families for many generations. These news institutions were as concerned with civic 
welfare as they were with news coverage.”). 
 253 DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS THAT BE 407–15 (1979) (stating that radio and 
television broadcasting brought a new immediacy to reporting, with substantial corporate 
resources devoted to harder-hitting, adversarial reporting). 
 254 James Fallows, Rush from Judgment, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 16, 2001), 
https://prospect.org/article/rush-judgment-0 [https://perma.cc/55FD-BXCY]. 
 255 Gene Policinski, Setting the Docket: News Media Coverage of Our Courts — Past, 
Present and an Uncertain Future, 79 MO. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2014) (“Where once ‘beat’ 
reporters developed over time the knowledge, sources, and trusted contacts in courthouses 
to improve their reports, reporters now ‘parachute’ into courthouses with little preparation 
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Fourth, polls reflected significant public confidence in the trustworthiness 
of the press,256 certainly when compared to the perception of the largely partisan 
press in earlier eras.257 This coincided with popular books and movies lionizing 
the work of intrepid journalists who helped democracy by uncovering evidence 
of public misconduct.258  
For a number of reasons, these verities began to change in the late 1960s. 
First, Americans began to lose confidence in all institutions, including the 
media.259 Distrust of government skyrocketed with an increasingly unpopular 
war in Vietnam and revelations of widespread misconduct by President Richard 
Nixon and high-ranking members of his administration.260 The decline in public 
confidence in a broad range of institutions has accelerated in recent years261 and 
 
and no opportunity to cultivate relationships and perspective.”); Kenneth L. Woodward, 
Neither ‘Objective’ nor ‘Post-Modern’, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 719, 
724 (2005) (“That is why reporters are not skipped from one beat to another day after day, 
but are actually, after a basic apprenticeship, given beats so they become experts in particular 
fields.”). 
 256 See Jones & West, supra note 244, at 580 (stating that more than two-thirds of 
Americans reported that they had trust and confidence in the mass media in the 1970s). 
 257 Baker, supra note 242, at 2129–31 (stating that census data from 1850 found that 
95% of U.S. newspapers were politically affiliated, and it took the growth of revenue from 
commercial advertising to prompt a move toward objective journalism). See generally JIM 
A. KUYPERS, PARTISAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF MEDIA BIAS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2013). 
 258 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward’s All the President’s Men (1974), a best-selling 
book followed by an award-winning movie of the same name (Warner Bros. 1976), detailed 
the dogged journalism that helped expose the Watergate scandal, which led to the only 
resignation of a U.S. president. The Post, released by 20th Century Fox in 2017, received 
nineteen major nominations, including Best Picture. The Post: Awards, IMDB, 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt6294822/awards [https://perma.cc/798W-VM2H]. It 
dramatized the difficult decision of the Washington Post to publish the Pentagon Papers in 
the face of threats from the highest levels of government; it is instructive that this 2017 movie 
was set in 1971. Mahita Gajanan, The True Story Behind The Post, TIME (Dec. 26, 2017) 
https://time.com/5079506/the-post-true-story/ [https://perma.cc/8NHM-LC3Y]. 
 259 Michael Schudson, The Fall, Rise, and Fall of Media Trust, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV. (2019), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/the-fall-rise-and-fall-of-media-trust.php 
[https://perma.cc/5ZZS-MM3W]. President Nixon’s vice president, Spiro Agnew, 
relentlessly attacked reporters as, among other things, “nattering nabobs of negativism.” Lili 
Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 235 n.13 
(2018) [hereinafter Levi, Real “Fake News”]. 
 260 For his part, President Nixon deeply distrusted journalists and insisted on using the 
term “the media” (rather than “the press”) because it had a “manipulative, Madison Avenue, 
all-encompassing connotation,” and because he thought that “the press hated it.” WILLIAM 
SAFIRE, BEFORE THE FALL: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE PRE-WATERGATE WHITE HOUSE 351 
(1975). Also contributing to declining trust in government was the rise of conservative talk 
radio in the 1990s, and more recently, partisan cable news and online partisan opinion sites. 
See Pingree et al., supra note 251. 
 261 Michael Dimock, An Update on Our Research into Trust, Facts and Democracy, 
PEW. RES. CTR. (June 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/2019/06/05/an-update-on-our-
research-into-trust-facts-and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/G83G-DY9C] (“Faith in 
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confidence in the press is at its lowest ebb in the history of the Gallup Poll.262 
Even more troubling is evidence that Americans are split when asked if the 
media is actually an enemy of democracy.263 
The economic model available to the media through the 1980s featured a 
steady stream of revenue from advertising, which in turn supported the labor-
intensive work of reporting, fact-checking, and editing.264 Now, the lion’s share 
of advertising has migrated to the internet.265 There are regular reports of 
 
expertise and institutions has declined, cynicism has risen, and citizens are becoming their 
own information curators.”); see Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-govern 
ment-1958-2019/ [https://perma.cc/977C-7XDT] (“Public trust in the government remains 
near historic lows. Only 17% of Americans today say they can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right ‘just about always’ (3%) or ‘most of the time’ (14%).”). 
 262 Megan Brenan, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Edges Down to 41%, GALLUP (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/267047/americans-trust-mass-media-edges-
down.aspx [https://perma.cc/S9M6-MWQF]. Republicans are far more likely to distrust the 
media than Democrats. Id.; see Jeffrey Gottfried, Mason Walker, & Amy Mitchell, 
Americans’ Views of the News Media During the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RES. CTR. (May 
8, 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/05/08/americans-views-of-the-news-media-
during-the-covid-19-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/NNV9-T3EZ]. 
 263 See Jones & West, supra note 244, at 581. This change in public trust in the media is 
unsurprising, given President Trump’s “nonstop attacks on the media” as “enemies of the 
people.” See Erik Wemple, Trump Called the Media ‘the Enemy of the People.’ He Means 
It., WASH. POST. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/20/ 
trump-called-media-enemy-people-he-means-it/ [https://perma.cc/G9P8-2AKN]. The 
President has referred to reporters as “scum,’ ‘slime, sick’, and ‘lying, disgusting people,’ 
and often accused them of ‘treason.’” ERIC ALTERMAN, LYING IN STATE: WHY PRESIDENTS 
LIE—AND WHY TRUMP IS WORSE 312 (2020). The Committee to Protect Journalists has 
identified a number of anti-press strategies employed by President Trump, including 
characterizing credible reporting as “fake news,” and concluded that the result is harm to 
democracy in the United States and abroad. Paul Farhi, New Study Says Trump Has 




 264 See Baker, supra note 242, at 2104; see also Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and 
What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 202–03 (2018) 
(lamenting “the demise of the economic model that supported newspapers and news 
reporting. The economic collapse of the (especially local) newspaper industry thanks to the 
rise of cheap speech is already having negative consequences for American democracy, with 
the worst likely yet to come”). 
 265 See Fernando Polo, The Painful Decline of the Advertising Industry (and What 
Marketers Should Do About It), GOOD REBELS (Sept. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/ 
@goodrebels/the-painful-decline-of-the-advertising-industry-and-what-marketers-should-
do-about-it-be826e319569 [https://perma.cc/24CV-9LYC]; Derek Thompson, The Print 
Apocalypse and How to Survive It, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com 
/business/archive/2016/11/the-print-apocalypse-and-how-to-survive-it/506429/ [https://per 
ma.cc/6WFL-BSFK]; see also MARGARET SULLIVAN, GHOSTING THE NEWS: LOCAL 
JOURNALISM AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 40 (2020) (most digital advertising 
has flowed to Google and Facebook and not newspapers and broadcast outlets). 
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venerable newspaper closing shop,266 and many smaller cities and towns are 
unable to support even a weekly news presence covering local government.267 
The number of one-paper communities has escalated268 and there has been a 
significant decrease in the number of working journalists,269 accelerated by 
media conglomerates scooping up struggling outlets at bargain prices.270 This 
has especially harmed coverage of local news, which has decreased dramatically 
in recent years,271 a crisis recently accelerated by the collapse of advertising 
 
 266 See Jill Lepore, Does Journalism Have a Future?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/28/does-journalism-have-a-future 
[https://perma.cc/BL7M-RPXX] (noting that between 1970 and 2016 “five hundred or so 
dailies went out of business; the rest cut news coverage, or shrank the paper’s size, or stopped 
producing a print edition, or did all of that, and it still wasn’t enough” to stop the 
hemorrhaging); see also Michael Barthel, Despite Subscription Surges for Largest U.S. 
Newspapers, Circulation and Revenue Fall for Industry Overall, PEW RES. CTR. (June 1, 
2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/01/circulation-and-revenue-fall-for-
newspaper-industry/ [https://perma.cc/8PAP-U9GJ] (noting that total newspaper circulation 
declined twenty eight years in a row). 
 267 Erin Keane, The U.S. Newspaper Crisis is Growing: More Than 1 in 5 Local Papers 
Have Closed Since 2004, SALON (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/10/16/the-u-
s-newspaper-crisis-is-growing-more-than-1-in-5-local-papers-have-closed-since-2004/ 
[https://perma.cc/P5D6-DUKV] (a report from the University of North Carolina shows that 
there are an increasing number of “news deserts”—communities that lack a local 
newspaper—and that many of the newspapers that remain lack the resources to effectively 
cover their communities). 
 268 From 2004 to 2015 the U.S. newspaper industry has lost over 1,800 print outlets. 
SULLIVAN, supra note 265, at 17. 
 269 Robert W. McChesney, Journalism Is Dead! Long Live Journalism?: Why 
Democratic Societies Will Need to Subsidise Future News Production, 13 J. MEDIA BUS. 
STUD. 128, 129–30 (2016) (“We are witnessing the collapse of journalism before our eyes at 
breathtaking speed,” with “one-third to 40% as many working reporters as there were 25 
years ago”); see also BARKIN, supra note 244, at 5 (noting the “painful process of job 
eliminations, the closing of foreign bureaus, and a new, stricter financial accountability for 
reporters, editors, and producers”). 
 270 For example, the corporate owner of USA Today, Gannett, now owns more than 260 
daily newspapers across the country. Marc Tracy, Gannett, Now Largest U.S. Newspaper 
Chain, Targets ‘Inefficiencies’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/11/19/business/media/gannett-gatehouse-merger.html [https://perma.cc/F4XW-
8L4H]. Corporate ownership doesn’t just lead to job losses and cost-cutting: it may mean 
less local news and a more conservative slant of the news that is covered. The outlets that 
have managed to survive “are mere shadows of their former selves.” Edmund L. Andrews, 
Media Consolidation Means Less Local News, More Right Wing Slant, STAN. GRADUATE 
SCH. BUSINESS (July 30, 2019), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/media-consolidation-
means-less-local-news-more-right-wing-slant [https://perma.cc/6XMC-86D5]. 
 271 See Jonathan O’Connell, Ghost Papers and News Deserts: Will America Ever Get its 
Local News Back?, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/ghost-papers-and-news-deserts-will-america-ever-get-its-local-news-
back/2019/12/25/2f57c7d4-1ddd-11ea-9ddd-3e0321c180e7_story.html [https://perma.cc 
/8STB-5PXV] (reporting that from 2008–2018 America lost a quarter of its journalists, the 
vast majority of them covering local news and that more than 2,100 newspapers closed in 
that time, seventy of them dailies). Those papers that do survive are greatly diminished, or 
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revenues due to the COVID-19 pandemic.272 This is not just a problem for a 
sector of the economy: when local news outlets shrink or disappear, the result is 
a range of harms to public life, including evidence that people are less willing 
to actively participate in democracy by running for office.273 It also becomes 
harder for the press to serve its important “checking function,”274 making it less 
likely that governments will be held accountable for police brutality and other 
official misconduct.275 
Most fundamentally, there has been what Jonathan Rauch has termed a 
“systematic attack, emanating from the very highest reaches of power, on our 
collective ability to distinguish truth from falsehood.”276 A functioning 
democracy must have a basic consensus on what is real and what is fake and the 
way to reach such determinations.277 This is something that was recognized by 
 
“ghost papers.” Lara Takenaga, More Than 1 in 5 U.S. Papers Has Closed: This Is the 
Result., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/21/reader-center/ 
local-news-deserts.html [https://perma.cc/SH4T-FMM6]. 
 272 Marc Tracy, News Media Outlets Have Been Ravaged by the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/media/news-media-corona 
virus-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/9N4J-3Q9P] (discussing how the pandemic has triggered 
an onslaught of pay cuts, layoffs, and shutdowns at many news outlets, as the economy, and 
thus advertising, cratered due to the pandemic). “USA TODAY owner Gannett reported a 
net loss of about $437 million in the second quarter [of 2020]” as the “journalism industry is 
grappling with a sharp reduction in advertising due to COVID-19.” Nathan Bomey, Gannett 
Posts Decline in Second-Quarter Revenue, Expenses as COVID-19 Takes Toll, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/08/06/gannett-second-quarter 
-earnings-2020/3298459001/ [https://perma.cc/ZU75-E87G]. 
 273 See Joshua Benton, When Local Newspapers Shrink, Fewer People Bother to Run 
for Mayor, NIEMANLAB (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/04/when-local-
newspapers-shrink-fewer-people-bother-to-run-for-mayor/ [https://perma.cc/25XD-5JX4] 
(summarizing research that has shown that local newspapers “increase voter turnout, reduce 
government corruption, make cities financially healthier, make citizens more knowledgeable 
about politics and more likely to engage with local government, force local TV to raise its 
game, encourage split-ticket (and thus less uniformly partisan) voting, [and] make elected 
officials more responsive and efficient”). 
 274 See Sonja R. West, “The Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO. ST. L.J. 49, 68–69 (2016) 
(the most important “structural role” of the press is for it to be on the lookout for “government 
malfeasance”). 
 275 See SULLIVAN, supra note 265, at 15 (quoting Tom Rosenstiel, executive director of 
the American Press Institute: “If we don’t monitor power at the local level, there will be 
massive abuse of power at the local level”); see, e.g., Margaret Renkl, In Memphis, 
Journalism Can Still Bring Justice, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/05/25/opinion/memphis-journalism.html [https://perma.cc/YNN4-NRTY] (“Ethics, 
fairness, accuracy, social-justice reporting, journalists who hold public officials to account—
all of these public goods are harder and harder to come by these days. . . . Such losses are 
particularly acute in places where no other media outlets are covering news that affects poor 
residents . . . .”). 
 276 Rauch, supra note 250, at 126. 
 277 Id. at 127–28; accord SULLIVAN, supra note 265, at 20 (“When local news fails, the 
foundations of democracy weaken. The public, which depends on accurate, factual 
information in order to make good decisions, suffers.”). 
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the Framers of the Constitution and remains true today, but this consensus is fast 
crumbling.278 
Our marketplace of ideas is being battered by a perfect storm of 
technological, economic, and political changes. First, social media platforms 
distribute disinformation that costs almost nothing to generate and then use 
sophisticated algorithms and granular data gathering to fine-tune and effectively 
target specific messages.279 Platforms like Facebook and Google monetize 
anything that garners clicks, meaning that the distribution of disinformation is 
profitable while deeply eroding the economic model that supported reporters, 
fact-checking, and editorial oversight.280 
Despite cascades of public criticism, internet platforms have for years 
refused to serve as “arbiters of truth” by monitoring the tidal wave of calumny 
that was posted and tweeted on their platforms,281 although intense economic 
and political pressure has recently prompted some changes.282 
Social media facilitate the rapid and inexpensive spread of misinformation, 
which gives new resonance to the old adage, “The truth never catches up with a 
 
 278 See MICHIKO KAKUTANI, THE DEATH OF TRUTH: NOTES ON FALSEHOOD IN THE AGE 
OF TRUMP 173 (2018). 
 279 Kevin Munger, The Rise and Fall of the Palo Alto Consensus, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/internet-democracy.html [https://per 
ma.cc/VR7U-CC3P] (“We can now evaluate how this technology affects politics and the 
public sphere. More information has been flowing, circumventing traditional media, political 
and cultural establishments. But the result hasn’t been more democracy, stronger 
communities or a world that’s closer together.”). 
 280 Rauch, supra note 250, at 133. 
 281 See Tom McCarthy, Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Be ‘Arbiters of Truth’ After 
Trump Threat, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/ 
may/28/zuckerberg-facebook-police-online-speech-trump [https://perma.cc/QP39-UYSR]. 
 282 Twitter and Facebook have recently taken steps to identify postings that are deemed 
to promote violence, undercut confidence in elections, or promote hate. See, e.g., Jordan 
Freiman, Facebook and Twitter Remove Video of Trump Falsely Claiming Children Are 
“Almost Immune” to the Coronavirus, CBS NEWS (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.cbs 
news.com/news/facebook-twitter-trump-video-misinformation-removal-children-immune-
coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/EN6W-QP87]. These changes, especially at Facebook, were 
in response to a boycott by major advertisers, Shannon Bond, In Reversal, Facebook to Label 
Politicians’ Harmful Posts as Ad Boycott Grows, NPR (June 26, 2020), https://www.npr.org/ 
2020/06/26/883941796/unilever-maker-of-dove-soap-is-latest-brand-to-boycott-facebook 
[https://perma.cc/G6W3-AJVF], which in a single day cost the company $56 billion, and 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg to lose $7 billion. Audrey Conklin, Mark Zuckerberg Loses $7 
Billion as Companies Drop Ads, FOX BUS. (June 27, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/ 
money/mark-zuckerberg-loses-7-billion-as-advertisers-drop [https://perma.cc/LQH3-
M34W]. However, it appears that the boycott ultimately had little impact on Facebook’s 
revenue. Tiffany Hsu & Eleanor Lutz, More Than 1,000 Companies Boycotted Facebook. 
Did It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/business/ 
media/facebook-boycott.html [https://perma.cc/9N8K-VL7L] (noting the boycott may have 
caused more damage to the company’s reputation than to its bottom line). 
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lie.”283 This danger is exacerbated by the enormous pressure that digital delivery 
puts on all outlets to publish first and verify later.284 Falsehoods circulating on 
social media don’t just harm our politics: they have caused what the World 
Health Organization has characterized as an “infodemic” of falsehoods about 
coronavirus that is “just as dangerous as the disease itself.”285 
 
 283 My use of the term “fake news” refers to the deliberate spread of misinformation. 
The phrase has another meaning in the current political context: “fake news” is any report 
that is inconsistent with the speaker’s world view. See Greg Weiner, The Towering Lies of 
President Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/ 
opinion/sunday/trump-woodward-coronavirus-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/792T-
4RWV] (“Everything that benefits Mr. Trump is true and everything that inconveniences is 
false.”). Cries of “fake news” is neither a new, nor a uniquely American, phenomenon. 
Timothy Snyder, How Hitler Pioneered ‘Fake News’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/opinion/hitler-speech-1919.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9RYT-B3GK] (describing how Nazis made their fellow citizens reject “a rational, factual 
world,” and reserved “particular fury for newspapers, demanding that they be replaced by 
propaganda organs that spoke to German emotions . . . Hitler and the Nazis found the simple 
slogan they repeated again and again to discredit reporters: ‘Lügenpresse’ . . . fake 
news”).There is also the sibling “alternative facts,” which suggests that there is a different 
reality than that described by the speaker. See Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an 
Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 177–78 (2018) (noting that “fake news” 
and “alternative facts” actually “point to the same phenomenon: In today’s political dialogue, 
we believe what we want to believe. Objective facts—while perhaps always elusive—are 
now endangered species”). 
 284 See Mathew Ingram, Twitter and the Incredible Shrinking News Cycle, GIGAOM 
(Feb. 13, 2012), https://gigaom.com/2012/02/13/twitter-and-the-incredible-shrinking-news-
cycle/ [https://perma.cc/S6PT-SNRS] (lamenting the loss of time to verify sources and 
accuracy before reporting); Logan, All Monica, supra note 149, at 201 (observing the twenty-
four-hour news cycle prompts journalists to “get the news first and fast rather than first and 
right”). 
 285 For example, in April 2020, the top health misinformation websites received four 
times the Facebook views than did the websites for the C.D.C., the W.H.O., and other 
reputable sources. Seema Yasmin & Craig Spencer, ‘But I Saw It on Facebook’: Hoaxes Are 
Making Doctors’ Jobs Harder, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/08/28/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-misinformation-faceboook.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Q52V-MQTR]. Studies show that conservative news sources fostered confusion about the 
seriousness of the virus via a “media ecosystem that amplifies misinformation, entertains 
conspiracy theories and discourages audiences from taking concrete steps to protect 
themselves and others.” Infection and mortality rates were actually higher in places where 
Fox News star Sean Hannity, who downplayed the severity of the disease, reaches his largest 
audiences. Christopher Ingraham, New Research Explores How Conservative Media 
Misinformation May Have Intensified the Severity of the Pandemic, WASH. POST (June 25, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/25/fox-news-hannity-corona 
virus-misinformation/ [https://perma.cc/3GSH-EG79]. Researchers from Cornell University 
analyzed over 38 million English-language articles and concluded that President Trump “was 
the single largest driver of misinformation around Covid.” Tommy Beer, Trump Is ‘Single 
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Indeed, technology is advancing so quickly that it is facilitating the creation 
of “deepfakes,” which depict people doing things they have never done and 
saying things they have never said.286 There is even more risk of misinformation 
from “dumbfakes,” which, while less convincing than “deepfakes,” can be 
easily created by manipulating video speed or selective editing,287 and the 
technology is advancing at a rapid pace.288 While there are inconsequential uses 
for such technology,289 a “deepfake” could compromise national security, when 
every second counts, or distort outcomes if released on the eve of an election,290 
and we have already seen them used to vilify political opponents.291 
 
 286 Rob Toews, Deepfakes Are Going to Wreak Havoc on Society. We Are Not 
Prepared., FORBES (May 25, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2020/05/25/ 
deepfakes-are-going-to-wreak-havoc-on-society-we-are-not-prepared/#49c1c1447494 
[https://perma.cc/K7RX-BWQU]. The technology to create them is outrunning the 
technology to detect them, id., and the cost to create them is minimal, Timothy B. Lee, I 
Created My Own Deepfake—It Took Two Weeks and Cost $552, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 16, 
2019), https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/12/how-i-created-a-deepfake-of-mark-zucker 
berg-and-star-treks-data/ [https://perma.cc/QJA4-XLTC]. 
 287 See Beatrice Dupuy & Barbara Ortutay, Deepfake Videos Pose a Threat, but 
‘Dumbfakes’ May Be Worse, AP (July, 19, 2019), https://apnews.com/e810e38894bf4686ad 
9d0839b6cef93d [https://perma.cc/W49L-2YGK] (reporting on a “dumbfake” that made 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi appear to be drunk). 
 288 Cade Metz, Internet Companies Prepare to Fight the ‘Deepfake’ Future, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/technology/tech-companies-deep 
fakes.html [https://perma.cc/G56A-9SEQ]. 
 289 See, e.g., Jessica Schladebeck, President Trump’s Social Media Pages Post Altered 
Photos that Make Him Look Thinner, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.ny 
dailynews.com/news/national/ny-news-trump-social-media-edits-images-thinner-201901 
22-story.html (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (reporting that President Trump’s 
social media pages contained photos altered to make him look thinner). 
 290 Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, 
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1776–77, 1783–84 (2019) 
(identifying risks from “deepfakes,” including “distortion of democratic discourse, 
manipulation of elections, eroding trust in institutions, exacerbating social divisions, and 
undermining journalism”). This phenomenon is not unique to the United States. Russia is 
conducting a sophisticated disinformation and propaganda “ecosystem” consisting of 
“official government communications, state-funded global messaging, cultivation of proxy 
sources, weaponization of social media and cyber-enabled disinformation.” Jennifer Hansler, 
US Accuses Russia of Conducting Sophisticated Disinformation and Propaganda Campaign, 
CNN (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/05/politics/state-department-russian-
disinformation-report/index.html [https://perma.cc/7C7M-WVN4]. 
 291 See, e.g., Ashley Parker, Trump and Allies Ratchet Up Disinformation Efforts in Late 
Stage of Campaign, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics 
/trump-disinformation-campaign/2020/09/06/f34f080a-eeca-11ea-a21a-0fbbe90cfd8c_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/Q6VC-UDYZ] (“[T]he Trump campaign . . . [is] disseminating 
falsehoods and trafficking in obfuscation at a rapid clip, through the use of selectively edited 
videos, deceptive retweets and false statements.”). Researchers attribute the rapid rise of 
fakes in recent years in part to President Trump’s regular use of them as a communications 
tool. Drew Harwell, Doctored Images Have Become a Fact of Life for Political Campaigns. 
When They’re Disproved, Believers ‘Just Don’t Care’, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2020), 
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Our current media environment would have been totally unrecognizable to 
the members of the Supreme Court a half-century ago.292 There are today almost 
four billion “active users of social media” worldwide, with the vast majority 
loyal to Facebook (their stories are viewed by 600 million viewers per day);293 
false information about the 2016 elections reached more than 100 million people 
on Facebook alone.294 Social media is now a dominant player in our political 
discussions, enabling politicians—President Trump has more than eighty 
million followers on Twitter295—to communicate directly with the public, 
unfiltered by the traditional media.296  
Anyone with Internet access can now see text, pictures, and sound designed 
to be attention-getting, even addictive.297 Where television organized its news 
coverage around the motto, “if it bleeds it leads,”298 social media outlets are 
 
htts://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/14/doctored-political-images/ 
[https://perma.cc/25LZ-YPLP]. Recent research points out that even if doctored images 
don’t change minds they reinforce existing beliefs and make people less willing to consider 
alternative verities. Id. 
 292 See Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1533–34 (2012) 
(detailing how newsrooms in the traditional media changed in response to the digital age). 
 293 Facebook Statistics and Facts, MARKET.US (Aug. 4, 2020), https://market.us/ 
statistics/social-media/facebook/ [https://perma.cc/7KB9-B4D8]. 
 294 Miles Parks, Social Media Usage Is at an All-Time High. That Could Be a Nightmare 
for Democracy, WUSF PUB. MEDIA (May 27, 2020), https://www.wusf.org/social-media-
usage-is-at-an-all-time-high-that-could-mean-a-nightmare-for-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6LGW-WMWF]. 
 295 Jonathan Garber, Twitter ‘Came Up with a Separate Set of Rules’ for Trump, FOX 
BUSINESS (May 27, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/twitter-rules-different-
for-trump [https://perma.cc/TF6W-N255]. 
 296 See, e.g., Frank Newport, Deconstructing Trump’s Use of Twitter, GALLUP (May 16, 
2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/234509/deconstructing-trump-twitter.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/RL4X-PPU3] (“In June 2017, Trump tweeted: ‘The FAKE MSM [mainstream media] 
is working so hard trying to get me not to use Social Media. They hate that I can get the 
honest and unfiltered message out.’”). 
 297 See M. Rex Miller, The Digital Dynamic: How Communications Media Shape Our 
World, FUTURIST, May–June 2005, at 31, 33, https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-
131858886/the-digital-dynamic-how-communications-media-shape0 (on file with the Ohio 
State Law Journal) (“Digital media combine text, graphics, sound, and data . . . [that is] 
multi-sensory, multimedia, and multi-networked.”); Sean Keane, Facebook, Twitter Are 
Designed to Act Like ‘Behavioural Cocaine’, CNET (July 4, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/ 
news/facebook-twitter-are-designed-to-be-like-behavioural-cocaine-for-users-insiders 
[https://perma.cc/43WZ-83QU] (“It’s as if they’re taking behavioural cocaine and just 
sprinkling it all over your interface and that’s the thing that keeps you . . . coming back and 
back and back. Behind every screen on your phone, there are . . . literally a thousand 
engineers that have worked on this thing to try to make it maximally addicting.”) (quoting 
Aza Raskin, founder of Mozilla); see also Luke Darby, Facebook Knows It’s Engineered to 
“Exploit the Human Brain’s Attraction to Divisiveness”, MSN (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/facebook-knows-its-engineered-to-exploit-
the-human-brains-attraction-to-divisiveness/ar-BB14FPxB [https://perma.cc/49R5-K93M]. 
 298 Deborah Serani, If It Bleeds, It Leads: Understanding Fear-Based Media, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (June 7, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/two-takes-depression/ 
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exponentially more likely to sensationalize and use sophisticated algorithms to 
separate users by ideology, amplifying one side of a story and creating echo-
chambers laced with falsehoods, with scant fact-checking, let alone 
contextualizing.299 This invidious process doesn’t even need human beings: 
automated “bots” amplify misinformation while masquerading as the handiwork 
of human beings.300 This facilitates decentralized, swarm-based attacks on the 
sources of accurate information, and can create artificial copies to spread lies to 
millions.301  
As but one example, a 2018 study published in Science found that on 
Twitter, falsehood and rumor dominated truth by every metric, reaching more 
people, penetrating deeper into social networks, and doing so more quickly than 
accurate statements.302 
And even if this blizzard of plainly, demonstrably, and factually false 
statements is rebutted by reliable sources of information, “they persist, 
and . . . belief in these and many other falsehoods appears to increase without 
regard to the actual truth of the matter.”303 While consumers of digital 
information may not actually believe all of the false assertions they encounter, 
 
201106/if-it-bleeds-it-leads-understanding-fear-based-media [https://perma.cc/V4XQ-QK4A] 
(“In previous decades, the journalistic mission was to report the news as it actually happened, 
with fairness, balance, and integrity. However, capitalistic motives associated with 
journalism have forced much of today’s television news to look to the spectacular, the 
stirring, and the controversial as news stories.”). 
 299 Chris Meserole, How Misinformation Spreads on Social Media—And What to Do 
About It, BROOKINGS (May 9, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/ 
2018/05/09/how-misinformation-spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/5T6Y-HD63] (“Human biases play an important role: Since we’re more 
likely to react to content that taps into our existing grievances and beliefs, inflammatory 
tweets will generate quick engagement . . . [social media can be a] kind of confirmation bias 
machine, one perfectly tailored for the spread of misinformation.”); Katherine J. Wu, Radical 
Ideas Spread Through Social Media. Are the Algorithms to Blame?, PBS (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/radical-ideas-social-media-algorithms/ [https://per 
ma.cc/6ZWZ-2HNC] (“[T]he spread of misinformation was an unintended consequence of 
the deployment of algorithms to maximize engagement. Social media platforms—very 
understandably—followed the money trail. . . . [But they also] ensure that ‘garbage floats to 
the top.’”). 
 300 See, e.g., Andrew Solender, Bot Army Behind ‘Reopen America’ Push on Social 
Media, Study Finds, FORBES (May 22, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/Andrewsolend 
er/2020/05/22/bot-army-behind-reopen-america-push-on-social-media-study-finds/#1fd034 
ce39b2 [https://perma.cc/5GUT-G38C]. 
 301 Chesney & Citron, supra note 290, at 1754 (“The marketplace of ideas already 
suffers from truth decay as our networked information environment interacts in toxic ways 
with our cognitive biases.”); Rauch, supra note 250, at 130.  
 302 Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-
study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/ [https://perma.cc/7PDS-Q9MS]. 
 303 Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 898 
(2010). 
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misstatements nevertheless sow confusion and erode trust,304 undermining the 
very possibility of a socially validated reality.305 And, of course, there is the 
evidence that published lies played a role in the outcome of the 2016 presidential 
election.306 
Unlike ordinary lies and propaganda, “deepfakes” and the broader category 
of disinformation erode belief in anything.307 Perhaps most alarming is the 
impact they have on the willingness of citizens to trust what they see or hear, 
creating a nihilistic and disengaged electorate that is unable to appreciate 
accurate information when it is presented to them.308  
The result of all of this is a political system under siege, since modern 
democracies need to both identify and circulate agreed-upon facts.309 Indeed, as 
political philosopher Hannah Arendt pointed out decades ago, “[t]he ideal 
subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or convinced Communist, 
 
 304 Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 
445, 472 (2012) (stating that false claims of fact have “become cascades, gaining adherents 
at dramatically increased rates and distorting politics, public discussion, and public policy 
itself”). 
 305 Rauch, supra note 250, at 131; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 290, at 1785 
(describing the “liars’ dividend,” which prompts people to disbelieve accurate information). 
 306 Levi, Real “Fake News”, supra note 259, at 250 n.65 (listing articles that discuss 
Russian influence on the 2016 presidential election by the promulgation of false news about 
Hillary Clinton in swing states); see also Jeremy Herb, Marshall Cohen, & Katelyn Polantz, 
Bipartisan Senate Report Details Trump Campaign Contacts with Russia in 2016, Adding to 
Mueller Findings, CNN (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/18/politics/senate-
intelligence-report-russia-election-interference-efforts/index.html [https://perma.cc/P5D9-
25MM] (Senate report details how the Trump campaign welcomed Russian meddling in 
2016 election). 
 307 As Steve Bannon, a close friend and political advisor to President Trump, observed, 
“[T]he way to deal with [the media] is to flood the zone with shit.” Rauch, supra note 250, 
at 129. 
 308 Sabrina Tavernise & Adrian Gardiner, ‘No One Believes Anything’: Voters Worn Out 
by a Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/11/18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/7QVP-ZXPR]. There has been 
pushback, as “fact-checking” websites, like FactCheck.org (sponsored by the Annenberg 
Public Policy Center), https://www.factcheck.org/, have attempted to correct the record, and 
there is even a new peer-reviewed journal, The Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation 
Review, https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/, but there is reason to question their 
efficacy. Research suggests that the very act of seeing a headline, even if it is flagged as false 
by the platform or fact-checker, can still contribute to belief in the underlying claim. Parks, 
supra note 294. 
 309 SOPHIA ROSENFELD, DEMOCRACY AND TRUTH: A SHORT HISTORY 1–2 (2019) 
(“Truth . . . has been touted as a key democratic value from the get-go. Republics, and, later, 
modern democracies have long prided themselves on both building on and generating 
truths . . . .”); Barron, supra note 142, at 101 (“[A] press that lies to the public or negligently 
publishes falsehoods vitiates its role in facilitating democracy-enhancing speech and thereby 
harms the populace’s ability to effectively govern itself.”). 
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but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction . . . and the 
distinction between true and false . . . no longer exist.”310 
We can point to many factors that play a role in this crisis, including the 
spread of post-modern theories about the contingent nature of truth from 
campuses to the mainstream,311 the rise of cable news and the twenty-four-hour 
news cycle,312 and the technological strides in both hardware and software that 
facilitated the rapid rise of the internet and social media.313 These platforms 
have produced an abundance of “cheap speech,” in both senses of the term: 
information that is inexpensive to provide and often of scant value.314 This 
unremitting flow of information was lauded by champions of the online world 
for its power to democratize the marketplace of ideas, not foreseeing that the 
deluge could also swamp public discussion.315 We now know better.316 
 
 310 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 474 (1966); see also Michele 
Goldberg, Trump’s Claims About Biden Aren’t ‘Unsupported,’ They’re Lies., N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/opinion/trump-ukraine-republ 
ican.html [https://perma.cc/E7E3-692N] (“[T]rump’s weaponized disinformation is 
corrosive to democracy . . . and erode[s] the political salience of reality.”); Peter Wehner, 
Trump Has Made Alternative Facts a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/opinion/trump-has-made-alternative-facts-a-way-of-
life.html [https://perma.cc/9SCM-TYGR] (“But epistemological anarchy is a mortal threat 
to a free nation. If there are no knowable truths to appeal to, no common set of facts we can 
agree on, no shared reality that binds us together, then everything is up for grabs.”). 
 311 ROSENFELD, supra note 309, at 140–42 (“All [of] which ostensibly explains why 
Roger Stone and Jacques Derrida have recently been showing up in articles together. This is 
a story about philosophy run amuck, topped with a dollop of karmic justice.”); see also 
KAKUTANI, supra note 278, at 160–61 (“Deconstruction . . . is deeply nihilistic, implying 
that the efforts of journalists and historians—to ascertain the best available truths through 
the careful gathering and weighing of evidence—are futile.”). 
 312 ROSENFELD, supra note 309, at 146–47; see also Alterman, supra note 263, at 256 
(describing an “echo chamber” of right wing media outlets that “successfully set the agenda” 
for the 2016 election, using “decontexturalized truths, repeated falsehoods, and leaps of logic 
[to] create a fundamentally misleading view of the world”). 
 313 ROSENFELD, supra note 309, at 149. 
 314 See Hasen, supra note 264, at 201 (“No doubt cheap speech has increased 
convenience, dramatically lowered the costs of obtaining information, and spurred the 
creation and consumption of content from radically diverse sources. But the economics of 
cheap speech also have undermined mediating and stabilizing institutions of American 
democracy including newspapers and political parties, with negative social and political 
consequences.”). 
 315 ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE 92 
(2019). Employees at Google, Facebook, or Twitter likely never imagined that their products 
would harm democracy, but the “systems they built are doing just that [by] manipulating 
attention, isolating users in filter and preference bubbles, and leaving them vulnerable to 
invasions of privacy, loss of agency, and even behavior modification.” Roger McNamee, 
Facebook Is a Threat to Democracy—and the US Has a Responsibility to Rein It In, 
PROMARKET (Feb. 6, 2019), https://promarket.org/2019/02/06/facebook-is-a-threat-to-
democracy-and-the-us-has-a-responsibility-to-rein-it-in/ [https://perma.cc/B5ZS-K65P]. 
 316 Joseph Bernstein, Alienated, Alone And Angry: What the Digital Revolution Really 
Did to Us, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/joseph 
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Despite this depressing situation, there are isolated situations in which truth 
can win out even with a playing field that is dramatically tipped in favor of 
protecting the purveyors of lies because of New York Times and its progeny. For 
example, successful lawsuits have been brought against provocative media 
personality Alex Jones and others who claimed that the mass murder of school 
children in Newtown, Connecticut, never happened.317 But even in this context, 
the New York Times rules required that grieving parents, who became “public 
figures” by advocating for gun control, prove “actual malice” by “clear and 
convincing evidence” if they were to protect their reputations, mental 
tranquility, and safety. These high constitutional barriers fail to adequately or 
fairly balance the needs to protect reputations and promote an adequately 
informed electorate with concerns that defamation law will lead to a timorous 
press.318 
V. CURRENT DATA ON LIBEL LITIGATION 
In New York Times, Justice Brennan raised the specter of libel actions 
putting newspapers out of business, writing, “Whether or not a newspaper can 
survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed 
upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which 
 
bernstein/in-the-2010s-decade-we-became-alienated-by-technology [https://perma.cc/ 
X5VK-A4AW] (“The feelings of powerlessness, estrangement, loneliness, and anger created 
or exacerbated by the information age are so general it can be easy to think they are just a 
state of nature . . . .”). 
 317 Parents of children murdered at Sandy Hook Elementary School, as well as an FBI 
agent who investigated the shootings, sued Jones and his website InfoWars for defamation 
because of the assertions that the shootings were staged by government-backed “gun 
grabbers” that used actors who pretended to be grieving parents. Elizabeth Williamson, Truth 
in a Post-Truth Era: Sandy Hook Families Sue Alex Jones, Conspiracy Theorist, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/us/politics/alex-jones-trump-sandy-
hook.html [https://perma.cc/J5DU-HMRZ]. The presiding judge also ordered Alex Jones 
and Infowars to pay $100,000 in legal fees. Neil Vigdor, Judge Orders Alex Jones and 
Infowars to Pay $100,000 in Sandy Hook Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/31/us/Alex-Jones-sandy-hook.html [https://perma.cc/ 
EAG5-JF2Y]. Bereaved parents also sued other hoaxers. See Susan Svrluga, First, They Lost 
Their Children. Then the Conspiracy Theories Started. Now, the Parents of Newtown Are 
Fighting Back., WASH. POST (July 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/educ 
ation/first-they-lost-their-children-then-the-conspiracies-started-now-the-parents-of-new 
town-are-fighting-back/2019/07/08/f167b880-9cef-11e9-9ed4-c9089972ad5a_story.html?u 
tm_term=.aeb39477d179 [https://perma.cc/8FUA-ZFZ6] (describing how, to prove that the 
conspiracy theories were false, the parents had to hand the presiding judge their son’s death 
certificate, “with its raised seal, to disprove the allegation in the book that images of the 
certificate had been altered or faked”). 
 318 See generally W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After 
All, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2003) (opining that it is unfair and illogical to make a 
person who is drawn in to a public controversy satisfy the demands of the current defamation 
law). 
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the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.”319 As detailed in previous 
sections, the Court responded to this threat with a broad and deep array of 
constitutional protections for the publishers of false and defamatory speech.320 
The entire New York Times regime has been in place for more than five decades, 
so it is now an appropriate time to evaluate whether the Court has realized its 
goal of deterring large damage awards in defamation actions.  
The Media Law Resource Center (MLRC)321 began tracking litigation 
against the media in the early 1980s and its data are considered the gold standard 
for assessing the frequency of defamation litigation as well as ancillary claims 
against the media, such as invasion of privacy and false light.322 When the 
tracking began, libel litigation had reached crisis proportions as the result of “a 
dramatic proliferation of highly publicized libel actions brought by well-known 
figures who seek, and often receive, staggering sums of money.”323 From this 
dire assessment by a leading scholar, one could conclude that that the New York 
Times regime had failed to provide the intended robust protection. However, the 
most current data suggest a very different landscape, one in which the pendulum 
has swung so far toward defendants that defamation law gives little redress to 
the victims of falsehoods and provides virtually no deterrence of falsehoods. 
 
 319 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964). Justice Black was even 
more blunt in his concurrence: “The half-million-dollar verdict does give dramatic proof, 
however, that state libel laws threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough 
to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of 
public officials.” Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring). 
 320 See supra notes 113–235 and accompanying text. 
 321 The MLRC is a trade group “founded in 1980 by leading American publishers and 
broadcasters to assist in defending and protecting free press rights under the First 
Amendment. Today, MLRC is supported by over one hundred and fifteen members, 
including leading publishers, broadcasters, and cable programmers, internet operations, 
media and professional trade associations, and media insurance professionals in America and 
around the world.” About MLRC, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.medialaw.org/ 
about-mlrc [https://perma.cc/3S9L-V6X8]. The MLRC was formerly known as the Libel 
Defense Resource Center (LDRC). 
 322 MLRC data is regularly relied upon by leading scholars. See, e.g., RonNell Anderson 
Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received by the News 
Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 614 n.171 (2008); Leslie Kendrick, Speech Intent, and the 
Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1676–77 (2013). While informative, the 
MLRC data are not complete because tracking filed claims and their disposition cannot 
capture all of the relevant data. For example, MLRC figures do “not reveal how many 
plaintiffs were defamed but never realized it, or knew of the calumny but were unwilling to 
shoulder the pecuniary and psychological cost of litigation that puts the plaintiff’s reputation 
center-stage, open to the prying eyes of civil discovery, and, perhaps, the community at 
large.” See David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel 
Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 518 (2001) [hereinafter Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches]. 
 323 Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law 
of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983). The MLRC does not track damages claims brought 
against individuals but does report on such cases anecdotally. 
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One important datum is that the number of trials arising out of media 
publications has “declined dramatically.”324 Indeed, there has been a “steady 
decline” in trials since the 1980s, which saw an average of twenty-seven trials 
per year;325 there were only three trials in the entire country in the most recent 
year studied.326  
Media defendants prevailed in 40% of the defamation trials from 1980–
2017, with that rate climbing to 50% through 2017, the most recent period 
studied.327 The median jury award from 1980 to 2017 was $350,000 and the 
mean was just under $3.4 million.328 Defamation awards over $1 million 
increased from 2010 to 2017,329 but it is likely that at least some of the huge 
awards reflected juries “sending a message” to corporate defendants generally 
rather than animus directed at the media330—the concern that animated New 
York Times.331 
The MLRC data show that the success rate of media defendants climbs 
steeply when post-trial motions and appeals are factored in. Since 2010, post-
trial motions have led to reduction of the jury award in 11.5% of the cases and 
to the elimination of the entire award in an additional 19% of the cases.332 Media 
defendants also had great success on appeal, with only 9.5% of awards that were 
 
 324 MEDIA LAW RES. CTR., MLRC 2018 REPORT ON TRIAL AND DAMAGES 5 (Apr. 2018) 
[hereinafter MLRC 2018 REPORT]. The organization tracks trials because “[a]s a practical 
matter, it is very difficult to obtain accurate data on complaints filed against the media.” Id. 
at 3. Of the data collected, 73.3% came from defamation claims, with another chunk (9.1%) 
coming from false light claims, id. at 25, a close cousin of defamation in which defendants 
can also raise First Amendment defenses grounded on New York Times. See G. Edward 
White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. REV. 513, 522 (2019). 
 325 MLRC 2018 REPORT, supra note 324, at 3. Of course, this phenomenon of the 
“vanishing trial” has been documented more generally. See generally Marc Galanter, The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). The literature discussing this phenomenon is 
voluminous. See Sarah Staszak, Procedural Change in the First Ten Years of the Roberts 
Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 692 n.1 (2016) (listing articles).  
 326 MLRC 2018 REPORT, supra note 324, at 23. 
 327 Id. at 25. 
 328 Id. at 36. This most recent mean is skewed upward by the inclusion of a single $140 
million verdict (the second largest ever entered against a media defendant) entered against 
the website Gawker, but the case involved an invasion of privacy claim and not defamation, 
id. at 1, the focus of this Article. After removing the Gawker case, the mean award from 
2010 to 2017 is lower ($2.4 million), and of course median awards are a more reliable 
assessment of risk because the mean can be skewed by a single large award that “blows the 
bell-curve.” Id. at 3–4. 
 329 Id. at 6. 
 330 Amanda Bronstad, ‘Jurors Want to Punish’: Why a Jury Verdict Goes ‘Nuclear’, 
LAW.COM (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.law.com/2019/10/17/jurors-want-to-punish-why-a-
jury-verdict-goes-nuclear/ [https://perma.cc/7HZC-F6CN] (discussing why juries award 
mega-verdicts against corporate defendants). 
 331 See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 332 MLRC 2018 REPORT, supra note 324, at 45. 
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appealed being affirmed.333 The total amount awarded dropped precipitously 
after post-trial motions and appeals: plaintiffs lost 86% of what juries had 
awarded.334 Most significantly, plaintiffs were able to entirely shield only 19% 
of the verdicts from some form of judicial intervention, while in another 6.7% 
of cases the plaintiff held on to part of the initial award.335 This is all powerful 
evidence that the combination of substantive, remedial, and procedural 
protections imposed by New York Times and its progeny are having the intended 
prophylactic effect.336  
These data show that as an empirical matter, libel actions against media 
defendants are rarely litigated, and even more rarely do they ultimately yield 
substantial payouts. At first blush, this trend is surprising considering the 
massive amount of false information circulating in all forms of media, and 
especially on the internet. Even beyond the cesspool that is social media, there 
are millions of opportunities for the publication of false statements in “hard 
news,” let alone on sports pages and in book reviews and obituaries.337 This all 
adds up to a world that is “bristling with opportunities for error, and thus liability 
for libel,”338 but which, because of New York Times and its progeny, results in 
precious few legal consequences for the defamer. In sum, the threat that 
defendants today face from libel litigation is virtually nil. 
VI. RECONSIDERING NEW YORK TIMES 
A functioning, let alone thriving, democracy requires a number of 
fundamental characteristics that are increasingly elusive in our country: that 
people are telling the truth most of the time, that truth is distinct from falsehood, 
and that we can tell the difference.339 These assumptions are not holding up 
under the assault in our “post-truth” society340 in which many citizens are 
 
 333 Id. at 47. 
 334 Id. at 50. 
 335 Id. at 62–63.  
 336 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 337 See Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches, supra note 322, at 520. 
 338 Id. Even if defendants prevail in litigation, the cost of liability insurance may have a 
deterrent effect regarding publication of falsehoods. Id. at 528. 
 339 ROSENFELD, supra note 309, at 17–18. The proliferation of falsehoods also hurts the 
economy by creating an atmosphere of mistrust in the marketplace. Robert J. Schiller, How 
Lying and Mistrust Could Hurt the American Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/business/how-lying-and-mistrust-could-hurt-the-
american-economy.html [https://perma.cc/2Z9P-XQSC]; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1565–66 (2006) (arguing that the most compelling rationale for 
imposing securities fraud liability is the “impact of fraud on investor confidence and thus the 
cost of equity capital” throughout the economy). 
 340 ROSENFELD, supra note 309, at 15; see also Alex Johnson, ‘Post-Truth’ Is Oxford 
Dictionaries’ Word of the Year for 2016, NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nbc 
news.com/news/us-news/post-truth-oxford-dictionaries-word-year-2016-n685081 
[https://perma.cc/SP6A-5CFH]. 
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convinced that there is no such thing as impartial, consensual facts and truth is 
increasingly being defined as “a matter of subjective feeling and taste.”341 
To be sure, our dysfunctional public square is not solely the result of 
Supreme Court decisions. The Court didn’t cause the technological revolution 
of recent decades, which has altered not just the news business, but the very 
ways in which citizens interact. Congress has also played a crucial role in the 
diminished quality of public debate by passing the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA), which shields internet service providers from responsibility for 
what appears on their platforms, making the mass circulation of falsehoods 
virtually risk-free,342 but with both Congress343 and newly-elected President Joe 
Biden favoring significant narrowing of its protections,344 there may soon be 
legislative changes that would amplify the rollback of defamation law that is 
urged in this Article.345 
 
 341 ROSENFELD, supra note 309, at 9. 
 342 A core purpose of the CDA is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012). The law granted online platforms 
broad immunities from liability for what users posted on their sites. See Julio Sharp-
Wasserman & Evan Mascagni, A Federal Anti-SLAPP Law Would Make Section 230(c)(1) 
of the Communications Decency Act More Effective, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 367, 367 
(2019). While the protection made sense in the 1990s, to allow fledgling Internet-based 
businesses to be free of almost all government regulation of content, there is a growing 
consensus that this laissez-faire approach is no longer justified. Facebook, Twitter, and the 
like, are not just “natural platforms” but rather powerful curators of the information that most 
Americans rely upon to learn about the world around them. See generally Joan Donovan & 
Danah Boyd, Stop the Presses? Moving from Strategic Silence to Strategic Amplification in 
a Network Media Ecosystem, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1 (2019) (emphasizing that platforms 
“curate news media alongside user generated content” and so are “responsible for content 
moderation on an enormous scale”). 
 343 Nandita Bose & David Shepardson, Senators Propose Reform to Key U.S. Tech 
Liability Shield, US NEWS (June 24, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/artic 
les/2020-06-24/senators-to-propose-reform-to-key-us-tech-liability-shield [https://perma.cc/ 
N6JB-P3XL]. 
 344 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Here’s What Could Happen to Section 230—the Internet Law 
Donald Trump Hates—Now that Democrats Have Both Houses, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (Jan. 
10, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/future-of-section-230-democrats-both-
houses-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/BUS2-LN2B]. 
 345 President Trump has long championed libel law reform, Michael M. Grynbaum, 
Trump Renews Pledge to ‘Take a Strong Look’ at Libel Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/business/media/trump-libel-laws.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HZJ2-KAHS], perhaps because he has had scant success when he has pursued libel claims. 
See Susan E. Seager, Donald J. Trump Is a Libel Bully but also a Libel Loser, MEDIA L. RES. 
CTR., https://www.medialaw.org/component/k2/item/3470-donald-j-trump-is-a-libel-bully-
but-also-a-libel-loser [https://perma.cc/G57B-GRGR] (recounting Trump’s history of failed 
defamation claims). This lack of success has apparently not had a deterrent effect. Tucker 
Higgins, Trump 2020 Campaign Sues CNN for Libel Over Opinion Article, Following Suits 
Against Times and Post, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/06/trump-
2020-campaign-sues-cnn-for-libel-over-opinion-article.html [https://perma.cc/3BUJ-588Q] 
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But the fact that there are multiple aspects to the problem346 does not mean 
that the Court should be unwilling to revisit constitutional doctrines that it 
created and that have facilitated our dysfunctional public square.347 The Court’s 
many constitutional protections made sense in the 1960s, when libel judgments 
threatened hard-hitting reporting done by major news organizations, but there is 
scant evidence suggesting that that is a risk in the current environment.348 In 
short, these sweeping constitutional protections are harming our democracy 
rather than protecting it, as the New York Times Court hoped.  
The Court could start with the low-hanging fruit by narrowing the range of 
victims of defamation who must satisfy the daunting “actual malice” 
requirement. For example, the Court could make it clear that a person is not a 
“public figure,” and thus has to prove “actual malice,” without proof of a truly 
“voluntary” and meaningful effort to engage public attention.349 A broader and 
more meaningful reform could be a return to the seditious libel justification for 
New York Times, by imposing stiff scienter requirements only when the 
plaintiffs are high enough up in government that they make, rather than 
implement, public policy.350 
The Court might bolster the search for truth, and thus our democracy, by 
revisiting the array of procedural modifications that the Court has imposed, 
 
(recounting defamation claims recently filed against the New York Times, Washington Post, 
and CNN). 
 346 There is also a role for state legislatures, which could provide better strategic lawsuits 
against public participation (SLAPP) protections for those who are sued for libel without any 
basis in fact. These claims, if successful, can provide damages and attorneys’ fees. See 
generally Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 342. 
 347 See David Cole, Foreword, in FIGHT OF THE CENTURY: WRITERS REFLECT ON 100 
YEARS OF LANDMARK ACLU CASES xxvii, xxi (Michael Chabon & Ayelet Waldman eds., 
2020) (noting that “cases are just part of a larger campaign for justice, one that occurs in 
multiple forums outside the Supreme Court, including Congress, the White House, state 
legislatures and courts . . . ”). 
 348 The only recent example of a civil action shuttering a media defendant involved a 
claim was for an invasion of privacy and not defamation. In Gawker Media. LLC v. Bollea, 
170 So. 3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), the plaintiff was the celebrity with the stage name 
“Hulk Hogan.” He sued the defendant, a website that had played sex tapes that involved the 
celebrity. A jury awarded $140 million and rather than appeal, the defendant declared 
bankruptcy. Sydney Ember, Gawker, Filing for Bankruptcy After Hulk Hogan Suit, Is for 
Sale, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/business/ 
media/gawker-bankruptcy-sale.html [https://perma.cc/TG7Y-3PCQ]. Besides not involving 
defamation, this case is not a justification for avoiding a much-needed revisiting of 
defamation law: a sleazy website that published accurate information about the sex life of a 
celebrity bears little resemblance to the risk facing the national media if Alabama juries in 
the 1960s could impose huge awards for minor errors in reporting on the crucial news of the 
day. 
 349 This is a position supported by Justice Clarence Thomas. See supra note 187. 
 350 See supra notes 164–77 and accompanying text. 
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changes that upended longstanding practices respecting the role of juries as fact 
finders and that have created a complicated and expensive appellate regime.351 
The Court could consider reforms promoted by knowledgeable observers, 
like the Annenberg Center, that would allow a plaintiff to secure a judgment of 
falsehood in return for giving up a claim for damages.352 Such a change would 
allow defamed individuals to vindicate their reputations at far less cost to the 
parties (and to the civil justice system), while lessening the chill to free speech 
that the common law of defamation represents. 
And finally, the most significant step would be revisiting the daunting 
“actual malice” requirement itself. For example, the Court should consider 
replacing “actual malice” with a less demanding standard, like proof of a 
defendant’s “highly unreasonable conduct.”353 
In sum, the data presented in this Article conclusively show that New York 
Times and its follow-on decisions have effectively immunized all but a handful 
of purveyors of falsehoods from civil liability. This has contributed to a debased 
public debate and harmed American democracy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
When asked what kind of government would result from the Constitutional 
Convention, Benjamin Franklin presciently replied “a republic . . . if you can 
keep it.”354 Over two hundred years later, we find our republic at a critical 
juncture, beset by falsehoods and deep mutual distrust. Congress could help by 
eliminating the immunity provided by the CDA and states could improve their 
own statutory law, for example by making it easier to pursue claims against 
plaintiffs who abuse the civil justice system by filing groundless libel suits.355 
We can also hope for fresh thinking from the American Law Institute’s recently-
announced “restatement” of defamation law, which provides a unique 
opportunity to address many of the concerns raised in this Article, as the 
 
 351 See supra notes 189–215 and accompanying text. 
 352 The “Libel Reform Project” of the Annenberg Washington Program in 
Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University proposed replacing traditional 
libel suits with a declaratory judgment action that only considered whether the statement was 
false and that limited remedies to retraction or recovery of damages for actual injury. See 
Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case 
for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 25, 26, 32–35 (1989); see also Robert M. 
Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform Legislation: The 
Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 291, 294 (1994) (discussing the 
Uniform Correction or Clarification Act, proposed by the Uniform Law Commission, which 
would also have broadly restricted punitive damage awards). 
 353 See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text. 
 354 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 85 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 355 See Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 342, at 401 (discussing SLAPP suits). 
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Institute’s work has often proved influential to courts.356 But at the end of the 
day, decisions of the Supreme Court helped create the mess so it is imperative 
that the Court be involved in fixing it. This crisis requires the wisdom and 
courage to reconsider the constitutional icon that is New York Times v. Sullivan. 
In the meantime, our democracy hangs in the balance. 
 
 356 Richard L. Revesz, Completing the Restatement Third of Torts, AM. LAW INST. (Apr. 
4, 2019), https://www.ali.org/news/articles/completing-restatement-third-torts/ [https://per 
ma.cc/77JQ-LLY3]. State and federal courts cited ALI projects as authority 2,600 times in 
the past year, a dozen times by the Supreme Court of the United States in its 2019 term. ALI 
in the Courts, AM. LAW INST. (July 23, 2020), https://www.ali.org/news/articles/ali-courts/ 
[https://perma.cc/798U-9ESX]. 
